Spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion: Theoretical foundations and empirical implications by Akamatsu, Takashi et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Spatial scale of agglomeration and
dispersion: Theoretical foundations and
empirical implications
Takashi Akamatsu and Tomoya Mori and Minoru Osawa and
Yuki Takayama
Tohoku University, Kyoto University, Kanazawa University
8 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80689/
MPRA Paper No. 80689, posted 9 August 2017 23:25 UTC
Spatial Scale of Agglomeration and Dispersion:
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Implications∗
Takashi Akamatsu†, Tomoya Mori‡ ,§, Minoru Osawa¶ and Yuki Takayama‖
August 8, 2017
Abstract
This paper revisits a wide variety of existing economic geography models in a many-region
setup. It investigates the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion intrinsic to each model.
In our unified analytical framework, these models reduce to two canonical classes: one with
a global dispersion force and the other with a local dispersion force. Their formal distinction is
that the former is dependent, whereas the latter is independent of the distance structure of
the model. These classes exhibit two stark diﬀerences. The first diﬀerence concerns their
response to transport costs: Global and localdispersion forces are triggered by higher and lower
transport costs, respectively. Consequently, in a realistic model with both types of dispersion
forces, a decrease in transport costs simultaneously causes both agglomeration at the global
scale and dispersion at the local scale. The second diﬀerence concerns the agglomeration
pattern: multiple agglomerations emerge and spread globally over the regions in the former,
whereas agglomeration always takes the form of a unimodal regional distribution of mobile
agents in the latter. Endogenous agglomeration mechanisms generally do not isolate the
locations at which agglomerations grow or decline for a given change in transport costs.
However, they oﬀer predictions for the global spatial distribution of agglomerations as well
as the local spatial extent of an individual agglomeration. This knowledge provides a con-
sistent explanation for the set of seemingly unrelated empirical results from reduced-form
regressions on regional agglomerations (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow, Brandt, Hen-
derson, Turner and Zhang, 2017; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Faber, 2014); it provides a new
set of testable hypotheses. Moreover, our analytical framework provides formal predictions
of treatment eﬀects in the structural model-based approaches for regional agglomeration.
Applications to the most standard formulations (e.g., Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Redding
and Sturm, 2008) are discussed.
Keywords: Agglomeration, Dispersion, Spatial scale, Multiple equilibria, Bifurcation
JEL Classification: R12, R13, F15, F22, C62
∗Acknowledgment: We are particularly indebted to Michael Pflüger and Jacques-François Thisse for their
constructive comments. This research was conducted as part of the project, “An empirical framework for studying
spatial patterns and causal relationships of economic agglomeration”, undertaken at the Research Institute of
Economy, Trade and Industry. This research has been partially supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research Grant Numbers 25285074, 25380294, 26245037, 15H03344, 15K18136, 17K14735, and 17H00987.
†Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, 6–6–06 Aoba, Aramaki, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980–
8579, Japan. E-mail: akamatsu@plan.civil.tohoku.ac.jp
‡Institute of Economic Research, KyotoUniversity, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606–8501, Japan. E-mail:
mori@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
§Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 11th floor, Annex, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI) 1–3–1, Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100–8901 Japan.
¶School of Engineering, Tohoku University, 6–6–06 Aoba, Aramaki, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980–8579, Japan. E-mail:
minoru.osawa.a5@tohoku.ac.jp
‖Institute of Science andEngineering, KanazawaUniversityKakuma-machi, Kanazawa 920–1192, Japan. E-mail:
ytakayama@se.kanazawa-u.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
Empirical studies over the past few decades have let to the accumulation of ample evi-
dence that agglomeration externalities are the major source of lumpy spatial distributions
of economic activities (see, e.g., Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, for a survey). A wide variety
of formal models have been proposed to investigate the underlying mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Duranton and Puga, 2004; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2015, for surveys). For analytical
tractability, most existing models rely on a location space that abstracts from the diversity of
interregional distances inherent in the actual regional economies, where a typical approach
assumes a location space comprising of just two regions.1 Summarizing the spatial eﬀects
in a single interregional distance simplifies the analysis. However, this benefit comes at the
cost of losing information on the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion.2
To see this, consider a model with any agglomeration force but without a dispersion
force. In such a model, all the mobile agents will concentrate in one region. If some
dispersion forces were added to the model, a fraction of mobile agents will deviate from
the concentration. In a two-region economy, there is only one alternative region to head for.
Hence, there is no variation in the spatial scale of dispersion. However, in a many-region
economy wherein interregional distances are heterogeneous, the spatial scale of dispersion
can vary depending on the nature of the dispersion force. Dispersion may occur locally to
avoid crowding inside the agglomeration as in the case of an urban congestion externality,
or it may occur globally through attraction from outside the agglomeration in the case of a
distant, less crowded market.
This paper revisits a wide variety of existing economic geography models in a many-
region setupwith diverse interregional distances.3 Characterizing their bifurcation behaviors
behind the spontaneous formation of agglomerations in a unified analytical framework, we
show that these models reduce to two canonical classes: (i) one with a global dispersion force4
and (ii) the other with local dispersion force.5 Formally, the two dispersion forces diﬀer in that
1Another typical approach allows for the presence of many regions that are equidistant (often zero distance)
from one another as in the system of cities model by Henderson (1974). See Tabuchi, Thisse and Zeng (2005)
for a recent such application.
2Many extant empirical studies have abstracted from the space between locations and have focused on the
local interactions between agglomeration size and location-specific factors (see, e.g., Combes and Gobillon, 2015,
for a survey). The empirical studies discussed in Section 6 belong to the other strand of literature that account
for global factors (such as interregional transport accessibility) on regional agglomerations.
3More specifically, we cover static many-regionmodels with a single type ofmobile agents (refer to footnotes
4, 5 and 6). We do not cover models with multiple types of mobile agents (e.g., urban models of Fujita and
Ogawa, 1982; Ota and Fujita, 1993; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm and Wolf, 2015;
Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2017), or dynamic models (e.g., Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009, 2014,
2015; Desmet, Nagy and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017; Nagy, 2017).
4For example, Krugman (1991); Puga (1999); Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002); Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003); Pflüger (2004); Harris and Wilson (1978).
5For example, Beckmann (1976); Mossay and Picard (2011); Blanchet, Mossay and Santambrogio (2016);
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the former is dependent, whereas the latter is independent of the distance structure of the
model. The most realistic formulations incorporate both the forces.6 Table 1 presents the
classification of the existing models.
These classes exhibit two stark diﬀerences. The first diﬀerence is with regard to the
response to transport costs. Global dispersion (i.e., an increase in the number of agglom-
erations, a decrease in the spacing of agglomerations, and a decrease in the size of each
individual agglomeration) is triggered by higher costs. In contrast, local dispersion (i.e., an
enlargement of the spatial extent of an agglomeration) is triggered by lower costs. In a realistic
model with both types of dispersion forces, a decrease in transport costs simultaneously causes
both agglomeration at the global scale and dispersion at the local scale. The second diﬀerence is in
terms of agglomeration patterns. In the former, multiple agglomerations emerge and spread
globally over the regions; in the latter, the agglomeration always takes the form of a unimodal
regional distribution of mobile agents. The typical location pattern can thus be described as
locally concentrated and globally dispersed for the former and as globally concentrated and locally
dispersed for the latter.
The notion of spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion is not pervasive in the em-
pirical literature of regional agglomeration. However, it is indispensable to understand the
evolution of agglomeration patterns in reality. Consider the case of Japan from 1970 to date.
The development of highways and high-speed railway networks in Japan was triggered by
the TokyoOlympics held in 1964. Between 1970 and 2010, the total highway (high-speed rail-
way) length increased from 1,124 km (516 km) by more than 10 (4) times to 12,068 km (2,388
km). The 359 urban agglomerations that have survived throughout the forty-year period
experienced a 34% increase in population size on average (controlling for the national popu-
lation growth). This means that there was a selective concentration from all over the country,
i.e., at the global scale.7, 8 However, this concentration at the global scale was associated with
a dispersion at the local scale: there was a 107% increase in areal size on average with a 34%
decrease in population density for individual agglomerations on average. These seemingly
paradoxical evolutions of urban agglomerations in Japan turn out to be a standard outcome
of a realistic model that combines both types of dispersion force (see Section 5.3).
Accordingly, our results provide novel perspectives for the three major strands of em-
Helpman (1998); Redding and Sturm (2008); Murata and Thisse (2005); Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
6These models are called class (iii), where, for example, the studies by Tabuchi (1998); Pflüger and Südekum
(2008); Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) are included.
7Each urban agglomeration is identified as the set of contiguous 1km-by-1km cells with population density
at least 1000/km2 and total population at least 10,000. Population count data is obtained from Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications of Japan (1970, 2010). The transport network data can be
obtained from the National Land Numerical Information Download Service of Japan at http://nlftp.mlit.
go.jp/ksj-e/gml/gml_datalist.html. See Appendix A for deitals.
8The population size of each agglomeration is computed in terms of its share of national total population,
and thus, the growth of the national population size is controlled.
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pirical literature on regional agglomeration. One is on the measure of agglomeration (e.g.,
Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and Overman, 2005; Brülhart and Traeger, 2005; Mori,
Nishikimi and Smith, 2005). The other two are on the reduced-form regression approaches
(see, e.g., Redding and Turner, 2015, §20.4, for a survey) and structural model-based ap-
proaches (see, e.g., Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, for a survey) to evaluate the impacts
of exogenous changes, particularly, those of interregional transport access on regional ag-
glomeration. Here, we highlight the basic issue in each context.
A scalar index has long been a natural choice for measuring agglomeration, reflecting
that abstraction from interregional distances has been the rule in the formal analyses of
agglomeration. On the premise of our theoretical results, when the dispersion force is
eﬀective at both global and local scales as in reality, agglomeration proceeds at the global
scale when dispersion proceeds at the local scale and vice versa. Thus, the meaning of the
net eﬀect summarized by a scalar index is unclear. In Section 6.1, we argue for the necessity
and utility of more disaggregated measures of agglomeration.
For the reduced-form regression exercises, consider, for example, a pair of contrasting
studies on regional agglomeration (i.e., at a global scale) by Duranton and Turner (2012) and
Faber (2014). The former focused on the growth of large metro areas in the US, while the
latter focused on the growth of peripheral counties in China.9 The former (latter) revealed a
positive (negative) correlation between the size of agglomeration and interregional transport
access in a given region. Notably, endogenous agglomeration mechanisms generally do not
isolatewhich existing agglomerations growor decline given an improvement in interregional
transport access although the theory has a clear prediction on the overall spatial pattern of
agglomerations in terms of their number and spacing. In light of class (i) models, these
opposite responses may simply reflect the diﬀerent sides of the same coin. That is, both
the results may indicate the tendency of agglomeration at the global scale (toward larger
regions) under the treatment, i.e., an improvement in interregional transport access (as in the
case of Japan discussed above). Thus, one must carefully interpret the estimated treatment
eﬀect, since it is simply an average eﬀect for the selected regions where the selections are not
necessarily systematic. For the excluded but treated regions, the sign of the impactsmaywell
be opposite. Section 6.2 provides a unified interpretation for a wider variety of empirical
evidence on regional agglomeration in terms of our theoretical results. We propose a set
of testable hypotheses on the spatial patterns of agglomerations and discuss the context in
which these can actually be tested.
Finally, regarding structuralmodel-based approaches for regional agglomeration, the two
9The amount of interregional highway linkages (e.g., the number and total length) within a given region
is often interpreted as a measure of intra-urban transport infrastructure (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Duranton
and Turner, 2012). But, we suggest that it can also be interpreted as a measure of interregional transport
infrastructure.
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representative models by Redding and Sturm (2008) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) belong
to class (ii), i.e., they cannot explain endogenous formation of multiple agglomerations by
construction. In other words, their basic premise is that the primary source of regional
variation in agglomeration size is the heterogeneity in exogenous (or first-nature) regional
advantages and that agglomeration externalities play only a secondary role. However, we
demonstrate that even in this case, the comparative static outcome is still governed by
agglomeration externalities and is specific to the model class. In fact, the signs of treatment
eﬀects on agglomeration typically reverse if multiple agglomerations are allowed to form
endogenously, i.e., class (i) models were adopted instead.10
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a generalmodeling
framework for analyzing agglomeration patterns in a many-region economy and defines
equilibria and their stability. Section 3 characterizes the nature of the dispersion force
and provides a formal classification of the spatial patterns of agglomeration in terms of the
spatial scale of dispersion force. Section 4 presents amapping of existingmodels of economic
geography to the classification. Section 5 outlines the impact of changes in transport costs on
the stable equilibrium patterns of agglomeration under the representative models. Section
6 discusses the implications of our theoretical results to the empirical literature on regional
agglomeration. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses future research agendas regarding
models with richer and more realistic structures that are not treated in this paper.
2 A general modeling framework for spatial agglomerations
This section introduces a generic format of many-region spatial economic models, which
we refer to as economic geography models, with agglomeration externalities and endogenous
formation of spatial concentration. As essential preliminaries, technical aspects (stability
and bifurcation of equilibria) and their economic interpretations are discussed.
Throughout our analyses, the term “region” indicates a discrete spatial unit wherein a
mobile agent can locate. Whether the model is interpreted to be intraurban, interregional,
or international is not essential for our results. A “region” may alternatively be termed as an
urban zone, a municipality, a country, and so forth.11
2.1 General format of economic geography models
The economy compromises K discrete regions indexed from 0 as i  0, 1, . . . , K − 1, andK ≡
{0, 1, . . . , K − 1} denotes the set of regions. There is a continuum of mobile agents of a single
10Refer to the discussions in Section 6.3 and the formal analysis in Appendix D.
11On assuming discrete space, also noted is that there are intrinsic diﬃculties with employing a continuous
space in empirical analyses due to the discrete nature of the data as well as numerical computations.
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type; an agent chooses a single region to locate within. We denote the spatial distribution of
agents by h ≡ (hi)i∈K , where its ith element hi ≥ 0 is the mass of agents located in the region
i. The total mass of mobile agents is exogenous constant H, i.e.,
∑
i∈K hi  H. In concrete,
the set of all possible spatial patterns is given byD ≡ {h ∈ RK | ∑k∈K hk  H, hk ≥ 0}.
Given the spatial distribution h of agents, the payoﬀ of choosing each region is deter-
mined. The payoﬀ function is denoted by v(h) ≡ (vi(h))i∈K , where vi(h) denotes the payoﬀ
for an agent located in region i ∈ K . Agents are mobile and are free to choose their locations
to possibly improve their own payoﬀs. Thus, the equilibrium condition for the spatial dis-
tribution of agents is formulated as follows: v∗  vi(h) for all regions i such that hi > 0, and
v∗ ≥ vi(h) for any region i such that hi  0. Here, v∗ is an equilibrium payoﬀ level.
The indispensable feature of economic geography models is the presence of space: trans-
portation costs are incurred by, e.g., shipment of goods between diﬀerent regions or social
interactions among agents in diﬀerent locations. Therefore, there is a fundamental trade-oﬀ
between transportation costs and scale economies associated with the spatial concentration of
economic activities (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). Payoﬀ functions of economic geography mod-
els include agglomeration and dispersion forces so that spatial equilibria are determined by
a tense balance of the two opposing forces that depend on the interregional transportation
costs. We assume that the spatial frictions between regions is summarized by a single friction
matrixD  [di j], where di j ∈ [0, 1) denotes the freeness of transport between the regions i , j.
Given the friction matrix D that encapsulates the role of the underlying geography, the
microfoundations for the payoﬀ function v(h) are typically provided by modeling the short-
run equilibrium relating to spatial frictions between locations. Assuming that relocation of
agents is suﬃciently slow compared with that through market reactions, the short-run equi-
librium conditions (e.g., factor and product markets clearing and trade balance) determine
the payoﬀ (utility or profit) in each region as a function of the spatial pattern of agents h. We
thus assume that the payoﬀ function v(h) includesD as a parameter.
In sum, our analysis adheres to themost canonical formof spatial economicmodels: static
models with a single type of mobile agent. In particular, the setup covers single-industry
new economic geography (NEG) models because location incentives of firms and workers
coincide. Thus, more involved models with multiple types of mobile agents,12 sector-wise
diﬀerentiated spatial frictions,13 multiple types of increasing returns,14 anddynamicmodels15
are not covered. These directions are discussed in Section 7.
12For example, urban models of Fujita and Ogawa (1982); Ota and Fujita (1993); Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002) as well as their recent applications, e.g., Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Owens et al. (2017).
13For example, Fujita and Krugman (1995) and Mori (1997).
14For example, Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999b); Tabuchi and Thisse (2011), and also Hsu (2012).
15Most notably, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009, 2014, 2015); Desmet et al. (2017); Nagy (2017).
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2.2 Stability and bifurcation of equilibria
With positive externalities of spatial agglomeration, economic geography models often face
a multiplicity of equilibria. A standard approach in the literature is to introduce equilibrium
refinement based on local stability under myopic evolutionary dynamics, where the rate
of change in the number of residents hi in region i is modeled on the basis the spatial
pattern of agents h and that of payoﬀ v(h).16 We denote the deterministic dynamic by
Ûh  F (h, v(h)), where the dot over h represents the time derivative. We assume (i) F
satisfies diﬀerentiability with respect to both arguments in D, (ii) agents relocate toward
the direction of an increased aggregate payoﬀ under F , and (iii) the total mass of agents is
preserved under F .17 Furthermore, we assume that any spatial equilibrium is a rest point of
the dynamic.18 Given an adjustment dynamic F , the stability of an equilibrium is defined in
terms of asymptotic stability under F .
Stability of a given spatial equilibrium is parameter dependent. As emphasized by the
NEG literature, changes in transportation technologies can trigger endogenous emergence of
regional inequality. The basic core–periphery story after Krugman (1991) is that “Consider
an economy with two regions that are ex-ante symmetric, where the regions have exactly
same characteristics and mobile agents are uniformly distributed. When interregional trans-
portation costs are high, the uniform distribution of mobile agents is a stable equilibrium. If
the transportation cost falls below a certain threshold value, the pattern is no longer stable;
the agglomeration toward one of the regions occurs, and the core–periphery pattern emerges
by self-organization.”
Although the intuitive story of the two-region economy backed by the rich interactions
of economic forces has its own right, corresponding many-region studies are scarce in the
literature. In particular, what spatial patterns emerge after an encountered destabilization
in a many-region economy is far from obvious. One needs better methods to examine the
stability of equilibrium patterns in a many-region economy.
Such an abrupt change in spatial patterns due to destabilization is an instance of bifurca-
tion. Thus, bifurcation theory in general provides the canonical tools to tackle our problem.
This paper builds on the following formal facts on stability and bifurcation of equilibria to
examine the formation of spatial patterns in a many-region economy:19
16Another approach is global stability analysis based on perfect foresight dynamics (Oyama, 2009a,b).
17For (i), we assume diﬀerentiability of F (h, v(h)) as a whole on the tangent space of D. The second, (ii),
is called positive correlation (Sandholm, 2010) which is defined by
∑
i∈K vi(h) · Ûhi > 0 for all h ∈ D. The last,
(iii), requires that F (h, v(h)) live in the tangent cone of D for all h ∈ D. Furthermore, even though this
paper focuses on homogeneous payoﬀs, one can analyze stability of spatial equilibria with idiosyncratic taste
heterogeneity (e.g., Murata, 2003; Redding, 2016; Behrens, Mion, Murata and Südekum, 2017; Monte, Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2016) by perturbed best response dynamics.
18That is, if h∗ is a spatial equilibrium, we have Ûh  F (h∗ , v(h∗))  0.
19For the rest of the paper, we had to sacrifice mathematical accuracy to reduce unnecessary burden for
general readers. For rigorous and general textbook treatment of stability analysis of dynamical systems and
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Fact 1. Consider a spatial equilibrium h∗. Let J ≡ [∂Fi(h∗, v(h∗))/∂h j] be the Jacobian
matrix of the dynamic F evaluated at h∗. Let the eigenvalues of J be g  (gk)k∈K .20
Then, h∗ is stable if all the K eigenvalues have strictly negative real parts; it is
unstable if any of the eigenvalues has a strictly positive real part.
Fact 2. Let h∗ be a stable spatial equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium at which every eigenvalue
of J(h∗) has strictly negative real parts. Suppose that any of the eigenvalues, say
gk , switches its sign because of a change in the value of an underlying model
parameter. Then, a bifurcation occurs: h∗ becomes unstable, and the spatial pattern
moves toward the direction of ηk  (ηk ,i)i∈K , which is the eigenvector associated to
gk ; given a real number ϵ, a pattern that can be expressed as h∗ + ϵηk emerges.
Note that when we employ Fact 2, we can focus on ηk with
∑
i∈K ηk ,i  0 because we assume
that the total number of mobile agents is preserved under F .21
The two-region story is related toFacts 1 and2 in the followingway. Consider a two-region
economy that comprises two regions 0 and 1 with completely homogeneous characteristics.
The uniform pattern h¯ ≡ (h , h) is obviously a spatial equilibrium. The (two) eigenvectors
of J are given by η0  (1, 1) and η1  (1,−1) with the associated eigenvalues g0 and g1,
respectively. The former, η0, induces change in the total mass of mobile agents and is
irrelevant in a closed economy. The latter, η1, expresses agglomeration of mobile agents
toward one of the regions, say 0. The associated eigenvalue, g1, then coincides with the
diﬀerential of the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the two regions ∆v(h) ≡ v0(h) − v1(h) up to a
positive constant. If g1 < 0, then a marginal increase in the population share of region 0
induces a relative decrease in payoﬀ in region 0. Hence, nomobile agent hopes to leave region
1. If a decrease in transportation costs changes the sign of g1 from negative to positive, then
relocation becomes strictly beneficial for agents in region 1, i.e., h¯ become unstable, and
agglomeration emerges.
2.3 Interpreting eigenvalues: Net agglomeration forces
By virtue of Facts 1 and 2, analyzing the eigenpairs (i.e., eigenvalues g and eigenvectors {ηk})
of J(h∗), one can examine when destabilization of a given equilibrium h∗ occurs and what
spatial pattern(s) emerge thereafter. Though seemingly mechanical, as one would expect
from the above example of the two-region setup, g and {ηk} have rich economic meanings.
bifurcation theory, see, for example, Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) and Kuznetsov (2004). An earlier
attempt to apply bifurcation theory to spatial structural evolution can be found in Wilson (1981).
20Allowing a notational abuse, K denotes the K-dimensional index sets for the regions and the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of J .
21Tobeprecise, to examine the stability of a given (interior) equilibriumh∗ it suﬃces to analyze the eigenvalues
of the restricted linear map J(h∗) : TD → TD where TD ≡ {η ∈ RK | η · 1  0} is the tangent space ofD (see
Appendix B.4).
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The sign of an eigenvalue gk dictates whetherh∗ is stable in the direction of the associated
eigenvector ηk . We provide some intuitions. Given an interior equilibrium h∗, consider a
small variation in spatial pattern such that h  h∗ + ηk , where ηk ≡ (ηk ,i)i∈K is one of the
eigenvectors of J(h∗), whose associated eigenvalue is gk . Then, under our assumptions on
F , one can show that22
sgn[gk]  sgn[δV(ηk)], (2.1)
where δV(ηk) and δVi(ηk) are respectively defined by
δV(ηk) ≡
∑
i∈K
δVi(ηk)ηk ,i and δVi(ηk) ≡
∑
j∈K
∂vi(h∗)
∂h j
ηk , j . (2.2)
Note that ηk ,i  hi − h∗i is either positive or negative. Observe that δVi(ηk) is the marginal
increase in payoﬀ in region i when the spatial pattern changed to h  h∗ + ηk . Accordingly,
δV(ηk) is the weighted sum of the marginal increase in payoﬀs all over the regions.
If gk is strictly negative (positive), δV(ηk) is strictly negative (positive). This implies that,
if gk < 0, the collateral deviation toward ηk direction is strictly undesirable for relocated
agents. To see this, rewrite δV(ηk) as follows:
δV(ηk) 
∑
ηk ,i>0
δVi(ηk)
ηk ,i  − ∑
ηk ,i<0
δVi(ηk)
ηk ,i  . (2.3)
The first (second) term in the right hand side is the average payoﬀ increase in the destination
(origin) regions of migration; thus, the weighted sum δV(ηk) is the net increase of payoﬀ
experienced by the relocated agents. If all {gk} are strictly negative, for any direction there
is no incentive to relocate and thus the equilibrium is stable. It is also intuitive to consider
a single hypothetical agent who may want to relocate from region i to j; her payoﬀ gain is
given by δV  δVj − δVi . If all {gk} are strictly negative, it follows that δV < 0 and there is
no incentive for such relocation. Conversely, if any of {gk} is positive, a collateral deviation
toward the ηk direction is beneficial for any relocated agents and a snowball eﬀect will kick
the spatial pattern out of the equilibrium; that is, the equilibrium is unstable.
In the context of economic geography models, one can interpret each eigenvalue gk as
the net force in its associated direction of deviation ηk in the sense that gk reflects the net
eﬀect of agglomeration and dispersion forces at work in the ηk direction. Depending on its
sign, gk expresses net agglomeration force (if positive) or net dispersion force (if negative).
In particular, if only one of them happens to be positive, then the spatial pattern is unstable
22See Appendix B.4. The discussion here assumes that gk and ηk are both real, as this property holds true
throughout our analyses below.
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Figure 1: A racetrack economy (K  16)
Note: The thin lines represent the transportation network and the black points represent the discrete
regions where mobile agents can locate. The regions are sequentially numbered.
and agglomeration occurs in the direction of the associated eigenvector.
3 Spatial scale of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion
Although the general facts on local stability and bifurcation of equilibria are in principle
applicable for any situation, in general geographical setups (i.e., assumed structures of D),
analytical results are diﬃcult to obtain; thus, formal implications are limited. This sec-
tion introduces a minimal and ideal geographical setup, namely, a racetrack economy that
considerably simplifies local stability analysis of spatial equilibria in general economic ge-
ography models. Despite the technical simplification, the setup preserves heterogeneities
in interregional distances—an indispensable feature to express spatial scale of agglomeration
and dispersion patterns. Employing desirable properties of the geographical setup, we re-
veal the two distinct spatial scales of dispersion force that determine the spatial pattern of
agglomerations. Concrete examples are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Racetrack economy: Desired testbed
We assume a racetrack economy à la Krugman (1993) (Figure 1).23 The K regions are equidis-
tantly spread on a circle and are sequentially numbered from zero, with transportation pos-
sible only around the circumference. The circumferential length is normalized to unity. Fur-
thermore, we assume that there are no region-fixed advantages in terms of, for instance, local
amenities or productivity diﬀerences. The geographical setup provides an ideal “testbed” to
analyze intrinsic properties of a many-region economic geography model for two reasons.
23Our approach to local stability analysis that utilizes a racetrack economy was developed by Akamatsu,
Takayama and Ikeda (2012), and an application can be found in Osawa, Akamatsu and Takayama (2017); see
Appendix B for a summary. As the approach focuses on local bifurcations from a given equilibrium, group-
theoretic bifurcation theory combined with numerical analysis provide complementary insights into the global
bifurcation behavior of equilibria. See Ikeda, Akamatsu and Kono (2012); Ikeda, Murota, Akamatsu, Kono and
Takayama (2014); Ikeda, Murota and Takayama (2017a), as well as Ikeda and Murota (2014).
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First, it allows us to focus on spatial patterns due to agglomeration externalities in a pure
form. In particular, it abstracts from location-fixed advantages induced by the shape of the
underlying transportation network. For instance, in a long narrow economy (e.g., Solow and
Vickrey, 1971; Beckmann, 1976), the regions near the boundaries have fewer opportunities
to access the other regions; the central portion is advantageous due to the shape of space. In
our setup, in contrast, every region has the same level of accessibility to the other regions.24
Second, despite its simplicity, the setup incorporates heterogeneities in interregional
distances. Let ℓi j denote the shortest path length from region i to j on the circumference;
then, we have for example ℓ0,1  ℓ1,0  1/K and ℓK−1,1  ℓ1,K−1  2/K.25 The heterogeneity
in interregional distances makes relative location in space matter, which is not the case for
the common two-region setup. Furthermore, the symmetric racetrack economy reduces to
the two-region setup if K  2; the former is thus a natural generalization of the latter.
In addition, in line with Krugman (1993), we assume that the spatial friction between
each pair of two regions takes Samuelson’s iceberg form, a standard choice for general
equilibrium models.26 In concrete terms, di j is given by di j  exp[−τℓi j] with a transport
technology parameter τ ∈ (0,∞). D is thus symmetric because ℓi j  ℓ ji . Moreover, each di j
is decreasing in τ. When we consider a steady improvement in transportation technology—
that is, continued decrease of τ—the spatial frictions between the regions gradually vanish
(di j → 1 for all i and j as τ → 0).
3.2 Local and global forces and the basic roles of space
The first virtue of assuming a racetrack structure is that the uniform distribution is always
an equilibrium when the payoﬀ function is symmetric across the regions. For this reason,
one can follow the extant theories where the spatial distribution of mobile agents is assumed
to be initially uniform and study endogenous formation of spatial patterns due to pure
economic forces. We denote the flat-earth equilibrium on the racetrack by h¯ ≡ (h , h , . . . , h)
with h ≡ H/K. Furthermore, it is typical that at the flat-earth equilibrium J and ∇v(h¯) are
closely related. If we let ek(τ) be the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯), we often have gk(τ)  cek(τ)with
a positive constant c.27 Thus, not only the sign but also the magnitude of gk(τ) matters—in
fact, the relative magnitude of gk(τ) represents that of agglomeration and dispersion force
24In this sense, our setup has an intrinsic complementarity with the many-region analyses by Matsuyama
(1999), who abstracted from endogenous positive feedbacks and focused on the role of geography itself.
25In concrete terms, ℓi j  min
{|i − j |, K − |i − j |}.
26Some models, e.g., those by Ottaviano et al. (2002), Tabuchi et al. (2005), and Picard and Tabuchi (2013),
have assumed noniceberg transport technology. In principle, our analytical approach is eﬀective with respect
to these models, albeit the analysis is far more tedious compared to the iceberg case; the models can be fit to
either of classes (i) or (ii) [or (iii)] discussed in Section 1 and to be introduced below. We shall refrain from
analyzing non-iceberg models to simplify our presentation.
27For instance, the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) satisfy c  h (see Appendix B.4).
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fk(τ)
1
0 τ
f1
f2
f3
fK/2
Figure 2: Eigenvalues of the friction matrixD for a racetrack economy with K  16
Note: Every fk(τ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K is an increasing function of τ. Those for 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 are shown in
the figure, because we have fk(τ)  fK−k(τ) for K/2 + 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Also, for each given level of τ,
fk(τ) is basically decreasing in k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 (see Appendix B).
toward the ηk direction.
The second and themost important utility of imposing a racetrack structure is that the role
of transport cost in the net agglomeration force becomes transparent. To see this, the notion
of spatial scales of agglomeration and dispersion forces is useful. Throughout this paper, we
call an agglomeration or dispersion force global if it depends on the distance between regions
(i.e., the friction structureD), while that do not depend on the distance between regions are
termed local agglomeration or dispersion force.
Below, we consider a toy model that reveals the intrinsic workings of a global force.
Consider the following simplest reduced-form payoﬀ specification that implements only a
black-box positive externality of agglomeration but no dispersion force
v(h) Dh, (3.1)
or, in the element-wise form, vi(h)  ∑ j∈K di jh j . This simplemodel is a canonical example of
models with global agglomeration force—an agglomeration force that depends on interregional
distances. It is evident that we have ∇v(h) D at the flat-earth equilibrium.
The net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)}, or the eigenvalues of J , are thus given by gk(τ) 
hd(τ) fk(τ) with { fk(τ)} being the eigenvalues of the row-normalized version of the friction
matrix D¯ ≡ D/d(τ), where d(τ)  ∑ j∈K di j(τ) > 0 is the row-sum of D.28 In a racetrack
economy, we have analytical expressions of the eigenvalues { fk(τ)} as well as those of their
associated eigenvectors {ηk} (see Appendix B). Consequently, the eigenvectors of J are
also given by {ηk}. The eigenvector associated with gk(τ) is ηk  (ηk ,i)  (cos[θki]) with
θ ≡ 2pi/K; we ignore g0 in the following because η0  (1, 1, . . . , 1) violates the conservation
of the total mass of agents.
28We assume the replicator dynamic as the underlying dynamic F for illustration (see Example B.3 in
Appendix B.4). Note also that the row-sum ofD is row-independent in a racetrack economy.
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0 1 2 3 15
η1,i
Panel A: η1 (monocentric)
0 Region i
η2,i
0
Panel B: η2 (duocentric)
η3,i
0
Panel C: η3 (tricentric)
ηK/2,i
0
Panel D: ηK/2 (alternative agglomeration)
Figure 3: Illustrations of the eigenvectors ηk (K  16; k  1, 2, 3, K/2)
Note: The negative (positive) elements of an eigenvector ηk indicate that if the flat-earth pattern is
perturbed into the direction, so that the new spatial pattern is h  h¯ + ϵηk with ϵ > 0, such regions
experience decrease (increase) in their population.
Figure 2 illustrates { fk(τ)}k≥1 for K  16. Each fk(τ) ranges from 0 to 1 and decreases if τ
decreases. When interregional transportation costs decline, the eﬀects of the friction matrix
vanish. Thus, we see that gk(τ) > 0 for all k ≥ 1, and hence, h¯ is never stable (Fact 1). Because
there is no dispersion force that can stabilize the flat-earth equilibrium, it is also natural that
h¯ is unstable for any value of τ.
The relative magnitude of the net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)} is of interest. To this end,
for the toy model, one can see that fk(τ) determines the relative strength between {gk(τ)}.
Note that fk(τ) is decreasing in k (see Figure 2), with the maximal f1(τ) for all τ. Thus, the
maximal among gk(τ) is also g1(τ). But why does this occur?
Looking at the eigenvectors {ηk} provides intuitions. Someexamples ofηkwithK  16 are
illustrated in Figure 3 for k  1, 2, 3, K/2.29 A negative (positive) element ηk ,i in ηk indicates
that if the spatial pattern slightly changed toward the ηk direction so that h  h¯ + ϵηk with
ϵ > 0, the number of mobile agents decreases (increases) in the region. In a symmetric
racetrack economy, the possible directions of change are characterized by the number of
peaks, k, or, in other words, by the number of population concentrations (i.e., agglomerations).
η1 (Panel A of Figure 3) is directed to a monopolar pattern with a single peak and hence
expresses the emergence of a global concentration of mobile agents; η2 (Panel B) expresses
the emergence of two major concentrations, while η3 (Panel C) expresses the emergence of
three major concentrations; ηK/2 (Panel D) expresses the emergence of the smallest possible
29To simplify the presentation, we assume that the number of regions K is a multiple of four. Qualitatively,
the exact number of regions is inconsequential if it is suﬃciently large.
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agglomerations. In other words, η1 immediately pushes the flat-earth equilibrium to a
unimodal agglomeration, while η2, η3, and ηK/2 (as well as other ηk except for η1) pushes
the flat-earth equilibrium to other multimodal patterns. As we assume a featureless space,
the peaks are equidistantly spaced.
Given the knowledge of {ηk}, the maximality of g1(τ) now has clear economic meaning.
We understand that the associated eigenvector η1 for g1(τ) is a unimodal, monocentric
agglomeration (Panel B of Figure 3). Since there are no negative eﬀects of agglomeration in
the model, a monocentric concentration is the most beneficial outcome for every agent. As
the number of peaks in ηk increases, the size of a single agglomeration becomes smaller. It
obviously reduces the magnitude of positive externalities and is less favorable. Also, fk(τ)
decreases as τ decreases because when the level of interregional transport costs is low there
is less incentive toward agglomeration.
3.3 Endogenous formation of agglomeration out of uniformity
For canonical economic geography models in the literature, at the flat-earth equilibrium, J
is related to the row-normalized version of the friction matrix, D¯(τ)  D(τ)/d(τ), in the
following form (see Appendices B and C):30
J ≃ c0I + c1D¯(τ) + c2{D¯(τ)}2, (3.2)
where c0, c1, and c2 are model-dependent (positive or negative) coeﬃcients. Given the
relation, the eigenvalues g  (gk)k∈K\{0} of J satisfy (see Appendix B)
sgn[gk(τ)]  sgn
[
G
(
fk(τ)
) ]
, (3.3)
G
(
f
)
 c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2, (3.4)
where ( fk(τ))k∈K\{0} are the eigenvalues of D¯(τ) (Figure 2). The eigenvector associated with
each gk(τ) is again ηk  (ηk ,i)  (cos[θki]) with θ ≡ 2pi/K (Figure 3). Recall that one can
ignore g0 provided that the underlying dynamicF preserves the total mass of mobile agents.
Employing our definition of local and global forces, we see that c0 summarizes the local
agglomeration and dispersion forces in the model and c1 and c2 summarize the global ones.
Usually, we have c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0. For example, a crowding-out eﬀect inside a region
due to congestion or point-wise scarcity of land produces a local dispersion force, resulting
in a negative constant term (c0 < 0); a global social interaction (e.g., Beckmann, 1976) is
30The notation≃ formatricesmeans that the LHS coincideswith the RHSmultiplied by some real, symmetric,
and circulantmatrixJ0which is positivedefinite relative toTD. For ourpurpose in this paper (i.e., local stability
analysis of h¯), we can practically “ignore” J0 in our discussion. Also noted is that the convention is just for
simplicity of presentation.
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0 τ
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Figure 4: Net agglomeration forces and their model-dependent and -independent components
Note: Top: The net agglomeration forces {gk(τ)}. We consider the simplest case: gk(τ)  G( fk(τ)).
Bottom left: An example of the model-dependent function G( f ). Bottom right: The eigenvalues
{ fk(τ)} of D¯, which are model-independent. h¯ is stable in the dark gray regions of τ or f .
suggested by a positive first-order term (c1 > 0); and goods demand from spatially dispersed
consumers in other regions (e.g., Krugman, 1991) is indicated by a negative second-order
term (c2 < 0).31
In the following, we assume the most general case of G( f ) in the literature: G( f ) is given
by G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2 with c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0, with two roots f ∗ and f ∗∗ for
G( f )  0 in (0, 1) such that f ∗∗ < f ∗. The shape of G( f ) under the assumptions is shown in
the bottom left panel of Figure 4. The functional form of G( f ) corresponds to a model with
a local dispersion force, global agglomeration force, and global dispersion force.
The properties of { fk(τ)} are completelymodel independent; because { fk(τ)} aremerely the
eigenvalues of the (normalized version of) friction matrix D¯(τ), they are invariant regardless
of the economic geography model (i.e., the payoﬀ function v(h)) one may assume. Instead,
the functionG( f ) in (3.4), or equivalently thematrix relation (3.2), encapsulates the net eﬀects
of economic interactions in the model and provides insights into the process of endogenous
formation of spatial patterns.
The question posed is as follows: given such G( f ), what spatial pattern emerges after an
encountered bifurcation? In particular, will it be a unimodal pattern or a multipolar pattern?
31In Appendix C, we present detailed analyses of how economic geography models are mapped to the
coeﬃcients {ci} taking models in the literature as concrete examples.
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Panel A: h¯ + ϵηK/2 Panel B: h¯ + ϵη1
Figure 5: Schematic illustrations of the spatial patterns at τ∗ and τ∗∗ (K  16)
Note: The size of a small white circle represents the number of mobile agent at the region. Panel A:
bifurcation at τ∗ (a locally concentrated and globally dispersed pattern); Panel B: bifurcation at τ∗∗
(a globally concentrated and locally dispersed pattern).
Choose an appropriate value of τ so that h¯ is stable; that is, the net agglomeration
forces {gk(τ)} are strictly negative so that any deviation is strictly nonbeneficial. Consider a
gradual change in τ. When any of the net agglomeration forces becomes positive, the flat-
earth equilibrium stops being stable and agglomerations emerge. What one should observe
here is the first gk(τ) that changes its sign from negative to positive. Let τ⋆ be a critical
value at which this occurs. It is evident that τ⋆, or the so-called break point, is a solution
to the equation maxk∈K
{
gk(τ⋆)
}
 0. Denote the index of the critical eigenvalue such that
gk(τ⋆)  maxk gk(τ⋆) by kcrit⋆ . Then, the spatial pattern at τ⋆ is expressed in terms of the
kcrit⋆ th eigenvector as h  h¯+ ϵηkcrit⋆ where ϵ is a real number. Under our assumption of G( f ),
the curves of {gk(τ)} behave as in the top panel of Figure 4; the upper envelope of the curves
represents maxk∈K
{
gk(τ⋆)
}
, and the critical points are found where the curve crosses the
horizontal axis. There are two solutions, τ∗ and τ∗∗, and we have kcrit∗  K/2 and kcrit∗∗  1.
See Figure 5 for the spatial patterns that emerge at τ∗ (Panel A) and τ∗∗ (Panel B).
The stability of the flat-earth equilibrium for the higher level of τ is attributed to the
global dispersion force, while that for the lower level of τ is attributed to the local dispersion
force. As transport costs decline from high level, the flat-earth equilibrium collapses at
τ∗ because the global dispersion force declines (recall that fk(τ) decreases as τ decreases).
When τ decreases below another threshold, τ∗∗, it brings about a situation where the flat-
earth equilibrium becomes stable again because the local dispersion force, which is always
existent regardless of τ, overcomes the agglomeration force.
3.4 Rethinking redispersion
Panels A and B of Figure 5 illustrate the two mutually distinct spatial patterns that emerge
at τ∗ and τ∗∗, respectively. Panel A illustrates the spatial pattern that emerges at τ∗, which
is interpreted as a locally concentrated and globally dispersed pattern. It is characterized by the
formation of many small agglomerations spread over the circumference. In the pattern,
mobile agents are locally concentrated but the location of agglomerations are equidistantly
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spaced or globally dispersed.32 Panel B illustrates the pattern at τ∗∗, which is interpreted
as a globally concentrated and locally dispersed pattern. In this pattern, agents are globally
concentrated to shape a unimodal distribution (a single agglomeration with a large spatial
extent).
The two critical points τ∗ and τ∗∗ are customarily termed in the literature as “emergence
of core and periphery” and “redispersion (revival of the periphery),” respectively, and the
process as a whole is denoted as “bell-shaped development” (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). When
transportation costs are very high (τ > τ∗), the symmetric equilibrium is stable. An the first
stage of the decline of transportation costs, the destabilization of the symmetric equilibrium
results in spatial inequality. In the later stage, once established, agglomeration is no longer
sustainable and the symmetric configuration is stable again (τ < τ∗∗).
The redispersion process is considered to be just the reverse process of agglomeration.
For any model with a single type of mobile agent, it is supposed that there is no essential
diﬀerence in the spatial patterns at the two stages (around τ∗ or τ∗∗).33 Indeed, this is true
in the two-region setup where the two relevant eigenvectors coincide: ηK/2  η1  (1,−1).
However, our analysis so far has shown that it is not the case in a many-region economy. The
two bifurcations at τ∗ and τ∗∗ are of quite distinct nature: each represents the emergence of
mutually distinct spatial patterns and are attributed to dispersion forces at diﬀerent spatial
scale, i.e., global and local.
4 Classification of models by the spatial scale of dispersion
The distinction between global and local dispersion forces allows one to reduce economic
geography models to two canonical classes: (i) those with only a global dispersion force
and (ii) those with only a local dispersion force. This section provides concrete examples
of global and local dispersion forces employing selected models in the literature. For every
model discussed in this section, J is expressed by up to the second-order term of D¯ as in
(3.2) so that G( f ) is (at most) a quadratic of f as in (3.4). Table 1 is the resultant classification.
Detailed analyses of models in the table are relegated to Appendix C.
32Observe that the spatial pattern resembles those obtained by the numerical simulations by Krugman (1993)
for K  12. The spatial pattern is also similar to the pre-assumed spatial patterns in the study by Tabuchi and
Thisse (2011).
33Takatsuka and Zeng (2009) analyzed redispersion behavior in the two-region economy new economic
geography model with multiple industrieswith distinct returns to scale and indicated an asymmetry in the two
processes: industrial composition at each region is diﬀerent in the redispersion phase.
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Figure 6: G( f ) for the models by Krugman (1991) and Harris and Wilson (1978)
4.1 Class (i): Models with global dispersion force
Global dispersion forces are those that arise outside of a given agglomeration, typically
implemented as spatially dispersed demand. Usually, a global dispersion force appears
in J as a negative (second-order) term with respect to D. For instance, the NEG models
by Krugman (1991), Puga (1999), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), and Pflüger (2004) satisfy
c0  0 and we have G( f )  c1 f + c2 f 2 with c1 > 0 and c2 < 0. Furthermore, the model by
Harris and Wilson (1978), a vintage model of spatial self-organization proposed in the field
of geography, satisfies G( f )  c0 + c2 f 2 with c0 > 0 and c2 < 0.34
Figure 6 illustrates G( f ) for Krugman (1991) and Harris andWilson (1978). Because G( f )
is a concave quadratic with G(0) ≥ 0, G( f ) has at most a single solution f ∗ in (0, 1); it implies
that a single critical value (break point) of transportation cost τ∗ can exist.35 As discussed in
the previous section, at τ∗, the emergent pattern is locally concentrated and globally dispersed (or
a multimodal pattern) in which multiple distinct agglomerations are endogenously formed
(Panel A of Figure 5).
The seminalmodel of Krugman (1991) is considered as an example. Appendix Cprovides
the omitted derivations of the indirect utility function and other formulae of this model, as
well as the results under the other models discussed below. The payoﬀ function (i.e., indirect
utility function of mobile workers) is given by
vi(h)  wiP−µi (4.1)
34For the drawn cases, the underlying parameters satisfy the so-called “no-blackhole condition” that ensures
the stability of the flat-earth pattern in the higher extreme of τ. Otherwise, we have G(1) > 0 and the flat-earth
pattern is always unstable.
35One can show that an influential model by Ottaviano et al. (2002) also endogenously produces globally
dispersedpatterns; hence, this is a class (i)model. As themodel assumesnon-iceberg transportation technology,
we do not discuss the model here to simplify our presentation (see also Footnote 26).
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where wi denotes the nominal wage of mobile workers and
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
h jw1−σj d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(4.2)
denotes the price index in region i. The parameters µ and σ are the expenditure share on
the manufactured good and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, respectively. The
wage is obtained as the (unique) solution of the so-called wage equation that reflects the
short-run utility maximization of consumers, trade balance, and zero-profit condition for
firms. In each region, there is an exogenous endowment of immobile workers.
For the model, one has
J ≃ µ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ −
(
µ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯2. (4.3)
The exact mappings to the coeﬃcients c1 > 0 and c2 < 0 are thus given by c1  µ(κ¯ + κ)
and c2  −(µ2κ¯ + κ), where we let κ¯ ≡ 1/(σ − 1) and κ ≡ 1/σ. The coeﬃcients c1 and c2
captures the net eﬀects of agglomeration and dispersion forces in the Krugman (1991) model,
respectively. In particular, µκ¯ in c1 represents the so-called price-index eﬀect, whereas µκ
represents a home-market eﬀect. On the other hand, c2 is the market-crowding eﬀect: µ2κ¯
in c2 is due to firms’ competition over demand from mobile agents and in κ is due to that
from immobile agents. For more detailed discussions on interpretations of coeﬃcients, refer
to Remark C.2 in Appendix C.1.
4.2 Class (ii): Models with a local dispersion force
A local dispersion force acts inside each region and does not explicitly depend on the spatial
distribution of mobile agents. Urban costs induced within each region (e.g., housing cost,
congestion externality) are typical. Examples include the frameworks of Helpman (1998),
Redding and Sturm (2008), Murata and Thisse (2005), as well as the perfectly competitive
framework of Allen and Arkolakis (2014).36 Furthermore, the model by Beckmann (1976)
focusing on the internal structure of cities (Mossay and Picard, 2011; Blanchet et al., 2016) is
another representative example.37 At the flat-earth pattern, a local dispersion force appears
36Without exogenous location-fixed factors, the model of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) (§3) is equiv-
alent to Redding and Sturm (2008). The model of Monte et al. (2016) also belongs to class (ii), albeit it adds
an extra urban cost as well as taste heterogeneity; we note that an idiosyncratic utility shock is equivalent to a
local dispersion force (see Appendix B for a brief discussion). It is also evident that Picard and Tabuchi (2013)
is a class (ii) model.
37We here consider a discrete-space version of the Beckmann model as formulated in the study by Aka-
matsu, Fujishima and Takayama (2017). Akamatsu et al. (2017) showed that a discrete-space Beckmann model
asymptotically converges to the continuous variant as the number of region increases.
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Figure 7: G( f ) for the models by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Helpman (1998)
in J as a negative constant term with respect toD (i.e., c0 < 0).
Figure 7 illustratesG( f ) for themodels byAllen andArkolakis (2014) andHelpman (1998).
For thesemodels, there exists atmost a single critical point of f ∗∗. If themodel parameters are
set such that there is an endogenous formation of agglomeration, the flat-earth equilibrium
is stable for the lower level of transport cost. At the only bifurcation point τ∗∗, a globally
concentrated and locally dispersed pattern (or a unimodal pattern) with a single agglomeration
is endogenously formed (Panel B of Figure 5). In this class of models, without location-
fixed factors, the only possible spatial pattern associated with agglomeration is a globally
concentrated and locally dispersed pattern.
Themodel byAllen andArkolakis (2014) is a recent example. The indirect utility function
of mobile workers is given by
vi(h)  hβi wiP−1i , (4.4)
where Pi denotes the price index for the model
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
hα(σ−1)j w
1−σ
j d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(4.5)
The parameters α > 0 and β < 0 are exponents for a reduced-form Marshallian externality
and for a local congestion externality in amenities, respectively, and wi(h) is themarket wage
in the region i. For thismodel, the source of agglomeration is the reduced-form local positive
externality represented by the parameter α. One has
J ≃ −(α + β − γ0)I + (α + β + γ1)D¯, (4.6)
with γ0 ≡ (1+ α)/σ and γ1 ≡ (1− β)/σ. We thus have G( f )  c0 + c1 f with c0  −(α+ β− γ0)
and c1  α + β + γ1. If α + β ≤ 0, there is no agglomeration force and the flat-earth equilibrium
is stable for any value of τ. If α + β > 0, there is a local positive agglomeration force; we
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have c0 < 0 and c1 > 0, as well as G(1) > 0. If the agglomeration force is strong (0 < α + β),
the model can express endogenous agglomeration. In the net form, as indicated in (4.6),
the model does not have any global dispersion force. Thus, we conclude that the model
produces only unimodal patterns. In fact, Figure VIII in the study by Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) confirms this result. In the other contexts, themodel by Beckmann (1976) (Mossay and
Picard, 2011; Blanchet et al., 2016; Akamatsu et al., 2017) yields a similar linear functional
form of G( f ) since the model incorporates a first-order global agglomeration force and a
local dispersion force.
As discussed by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), their model is isomorphic to the Helpman
(1998) model with local landownership (i.e., Redding and Sturm, 2008). One can show that
the assumptions concerning landownershipdonot alter the above conclusion. ForHelpman’s
original model, with public landownership, under appropriate normalizations, one obtains
J ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 so that G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2 with c0  −(1 − µ), c1  µ(κ¯ + κ), and
c2  −(κ+ µ2κ¯)+ (1− µ). Again, κ¯  1/(σ− 1) and κ  1/σ where µ is the expenditure share
on manufactured goods, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between manufactured goods.
We have c0 < 0, c1 > 0, and c2 < 0; for the model, the agglomeration force is derived from
the second term in J , whereas dispersion forces are derived from the others. Observe that
c1 is as per the model by Krugman (1991), meaning that the agglomeration force of the latter
is isomorphic to that of the former. Panel B of Figure 7 illustrates the shape of G( f ) for the
model. It follows that whenever there is an endogenous agglomeration, we have G(1) > 0;
thus, f ∗ does not exist; although c2 < 0 and there seemingly exists a global dispersion force,
it is not eﬀective. The main dispersion force of the model is derived from the consumption
of non-tradable housing stock that produces a negative pecuniary externality through the
local housing market.
4.3 Classification of representative economic geography models
Table 1 classifies representative economic geography models in the literature according to
the nature of their dispersion forces and resulting stable spatial patterns (including our toy
model discussed in Section 3.2). The exact mapping to the coeﬃcients of G( f ) is provided by
Table 2 at the end ofAppendixC.As discussed, at the flat-earth equilibriumof a givenmodel,
one can characterize the fundamental trade-oﬀ between the centripetal and centrifugal forces
by the coeﬃcients {ci} or the shape of G( f ). In particular, one can clearly distinguish the
spatial scale of the model’s eﬀective dispersion force.
There are two canonical model classes (i) and (ii). The former includes models with only
a global dispersion force, while the latter includes models with only local dispersion force.
The second column of Table 1 summarizes characteristic spatial patterns for each of the
two model classes. Although our analysis basically concerns the endogenous formation of
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Table 1: Classification of economic geography models in the literature
Dispersion force Spatial patterns Economic geography models
None
Concentration
to a single region
(unimodal patterns)
The toy model defined by (3.1)
Only global
[class (i)]
Locally concentrated
and globally dispersed
(multimodal patterns)
Krugman (1991)
Puga (1999)
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)
Pflüger (2004)
Harris and Wilson (1978)
Only local
[class (ii)]
Globally concentrated
and locally dispersed
(unimodal patterns)
Helpman (1998)
Murata and Thisse (2005)
Redding and Sturm (2008)
Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) (§3)
Beckmann (1976)
Mossay and Picard (2011)
Blanchet et al. (2016)
Both
[class (iii)]
Mixed characteristics
of the classes (i) and (ii)
(multimodal patterns)
Tabuchi (1998)
Pflüger and Südekum (2008)
Takayama and Akamatsu (2011)
Note: Appendix C provides detailed analyses of the models, with Table 2 summarizing the exact
mappings of each model to the coeﬃcients of the corresponding model-dependent function G( f ) 
c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2.
spatial patterns under a multiplicity of equilibria, class (i) and (ii) models have qualitatively
diﬀerent behavior and can yield mutually contradicting implications when employed for
counterfactual exercises. This point is discussed in Section 6.3, and a formal analysis is
provided in Appendix D.
In addition, there are a few models in the literature that have the two dispersion forces
eﬀectively at work. For instance, Tabuchi (1998), Pflüger and Südekum (2008), and Takayama
and Akamatsu (2011) presented both local and global dispersion forces. We refer to them as
class (iii) models. The models produce spatial patterns with mixed characteristics of global
and local dispersion, which we discuss below by employing a numerical example. For this
model class, G( f ) is a concave quadratic that has two roots in the (0, 1) interval as in the
bottom left panel of Figure 4. As we discussed in Section 3, the flat-earth equilibrium is
stable for both high and low transport costs.
Notably, our classification seems to be backed by a more general principle. There is a
large body of studies outside economics focused on spatial pattern formation, typically on
the basis of reaction–diﬀusion systems (Kondo and Miura, 2010). In that literature, it is
now widely accepted that the basic requirement to form multiple peaks in stationary spatial
patterns (i.e., in our context, stable locally concentrated and globally dispersed patterns)
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is a short-range positive feedback combined with a long-range negative feedback with respect to
a concentration of mobile factors (Meinhardt and Gierer, 2000). One would notice that a
negative term (global dispersion force) of D¯ in J can be interpreted as a long-range negative
feedback.
5 Numerical examples
In the many-region setup, the first bifurcation, or emergence of agglomeration, may not be
the end of the story. The overall evolutionary path of spatial structure in line withmonotonic
change (e.g., decline) of transportation costs is of interest. Fortunately, intrinsic properties of
the whole evolutionary process of the agglomeration patterns can be qualitatively predicted
by the above results on the stability of the flat-earth pattern. This section provides some
numerical illustrations. The models of Krugman (1991), Helpman (1998), and Pflüger and
Südekum (2008) are chosen as representative examples for the models with only global
dispersion force [class (i)], those with only local dispersion force [class (ii)], and those with
both dispersion forces [class (iii)], respectively. The numerical examples in this section are
conducted in an eight-region (K  8) symmetric racetrack economy. Following the literature,
the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) is employed as the underlying dynamic F .
The chosen parameters are described in Appendix C.
5.1 Class (i): Models with a global dispersion force
Figure 8 reports an evolutionary path of stable equilibrium patterns in the course of decreas-
ing τ for the Krugman (1991) model. The black solid (dashed) curves depict stable (unstable)
equilibrium values of population share λ  (λi) at each τ, where λi ≡ hi/H. Consider a
gradual decrease in τ from a suﬃciently high level at which the flat-earth equilibrium is
stable. The uniform distribution with no agglomerations is initially stable until τ reaches the
break point τ∗. As discussed in the previous section, the bifurcation at τ∗ pushes the spatial
pattern toward the direction of ηK/2  (1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1). It results in the formation
of a globally dispersed pattern with four disjoint and equidistantly separated point-wise ag-
glomerations. Further decrease in τ triggers the second and third bifurcations at τ∗∗ and τ∗∗∗,
respectively.38 Observe that the bifurcations at τ∗∗ and τ∗∗∗ sequentially double the spacing
between agglomerated regions, reducing their number as 4 → 2 → 1. At the lower extreme
of τ, a monopolar pattern emerges. Note that each agglomeration has no spatial extent at
any level of transportation cost, since local dispersion force is absent. In the model, better
interregional access (a smaller τ) makes the size of each agglomeration larger. Such eﬀect
38In fact, one can analytically derive these critical values τ∗∗, τ∗∗∗ (see Akamatsu et al., 2012; Osawa et al.,
2017) and characterize spatial patterns that emerge at these points.
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Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram of a class (i) model
Note: Krugman (1991) is taken as the underlying example model.
is, however, limited to the selected regions. Depending on the stage of spatial structural
evolution, the impact of improvement of transportation on the size of each agglomeration
can be either positive (for the selected regions) or negative (for the others). In this sense,
there are no monotonic relationships between the level of transportation costs and the size
of each agglomeration. In fact, this point is already apparent in the two-region models that
explicitly incorporate agglomeration economies combined with interregional distance.
In our many-region setup, however, there comes another indeterminacy. As the spatial
structure evolves, once selected regions may decline to form the hinterland of the currently
selected ones—the agglomeration shadow.39 Consider the fourth region at the six o’clock
position in Figure 8 as an example. The region is selected at the transitions at τ∗ and τ∗∗
so that the impact of a decrease in τ is positive. After τ∗∗∗ is encountered, however, it
immediately loses its population. For the region, a monotonic decrease in τ implies a win
situation followed by a lose situation. It indicates that if empirical realities resemble this
class of model, whether the impact of a further decline in transportation costs on a specific
region is positive or negative is indeterminate even when a monotonic relation for the region
is supported by historical data. At least in a symmetric racetrack economy, we do not have
any clear implication for models in this class regarding the impact of a uniform reduction
of transport cost on the population (or output) size of an individual region since whether
the population share of a region grows or declines is in principle indeterminate a priori.
Instead, possible predictions are focused on the global spatial distribution of agglomerations:
the number of concentrations and the spacing between themwhichmonotonically decreases
and increases, respectively.
39The concept of agglomeration shadow was first introduced by Arthur (1994) and is formalized in the
context of a general equilibrium model by Fujita and Krugman (1995).
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram of a class (ii) model
Note: Allen and Arkolakis (2014) is taken as the underlying example model.
5.2 Class (ii): Models with local dispersion force
Figure 9 is similar to Figure 8 for the model by Allen and Arkolakis (2014). The model
incorporates only a local dispersion force; the flat-earth equilibrium is stable for lower values
of τ. At τ∗∗ in Figure 7, a bifurcation in the direction of η1 leads to the emergence of a
unimodal pattern. This is the bifurcation in the model; after the emergence of the unimodal
pattern at τ∗∗, when τ increases further, the spatial pattern monotonically and smoothly
converges to a monopolar pattern (i.e., the complete concentration of mobile agents at a
single region) as τ approaches to infinity. Thus, if we define the number of agglomerations
for the model by that of peaks (i.e., local maxima) in h, it is at most one. The model does not
allow locally concentrated and globally dispersed patterns to emerge; such models would
be interpreted as expressing the evolution of the spatial extent of a single agglomeration.
Quantitative spatial models that employ class (ii) models (e.g., Redding and Sturm,
2008; Allen and Arkolakis, 2014) emphasize the uniqueness of equilibrium, through which
calibrations and counterfactual analyses have determinate implications. The studies are
conducted under parameter settings that ensure uniqueness of equilibrium regardless of the
level of interregional transportation costs (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). This is made
possible because the local dispersion force in class (ii) models does not depend on the level
of accessibility to the other regions; consequently, if a suﬃciently strong local dispersion
force is imposed, there is no endogenous agglomeration due to a decline in transportation
costs. Notably, in our setup, since the uniform distribution of mobile agents across regions
is always an equilibrium on a symmetric racetrack, uniqueness of equilibrium automatically
implies that the flat-earth pattern h¯ is the only equilibrium and is stable. Figure 10 indicates
our classification of possible spatial patterns and their stability for the model by Allen and
Arkolakis (2014) in a racetrack economy with arbitrary K. Their uniqueness condition is
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Multiple equilibria.
h¯ is always unstable.
Range II: −α < β < β¯
Multiple equilibria.
h¯ is stable for low values of τ.
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Figure 10: Classification of uniqueness and stability of equilibria for Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
Note: We let α  0.6 and σ  4 for illustration. h¯ is stable in the dark gray region, while not in the
light gray region. At τ∗∗ such that g1(τ∗∗)  0, a unimodal pattern emerges. α + β ≤ 0 is a suﬃcient
condition for the stability of h¯ regardless of τ. A comparison with Figure I of Allen and Arkolakis
(2014), where their classification corresponds to Ranges I, II, and III above, would be interesting.
β ≤ −α (i.e., Range III in the figure).40 One will observe that uniqueness directly implies that
the uniform distribution is stable regardless of the level of τ.
5.3 Class (iii): Models with both dispersion forces
Tabuchi (1998), Pflüger and Südekum (2008), and Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) con-
sidered both local and global dispersion forces. In eﬀect, these models exhibit rich and
meaningful interplay between the number and spacing of agglomerations and spatial extent of
each agglomerationwithout any location-fixed factors but only with pure economic forces.
Onewould expect that in thesemodels, the evolutionary process of spatial agglomeration
patterns in the course of monotonic change in τ is in some sense a combination of the two
examples presented above. This is indeed the case. Figure 11 depicts the evolution of
the number of agglomerations in the course of decreasing τ for the model by Pflüger and
Südekum (2008) in a symmetric eight-region racetrack economy. We define the number of
agglomerations in a spatial distribution of mobile agents, h, by that of the local maxima
therein.41 Comparing Figure 11 with Figure 8 and Figure 9, we observe that the former is
basically a combination of the latter two, as expected. When τ gradually decreases from a
very high level, the number of agglomerations evolves as 0 → 4 → 2 → 1 as in the class (i)
models (Figure 8), while in the later stage 1 → 0 as per the class (ii) models (Figure 9).42 The
initial stage is governed by a decline of the global dispersion force, while the later stage is
40For the model by Helpman (1998), the condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium is given by (1− µ)σ > 1.
41For example, for Pattern I in Figure 12, we evenly split the population of the region in the middle of the
two peaks. Also, if two consecutive regions have the same population as in Pattern K in Figure 12, it is counted
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Figure 11: Evolution of the number of agglomerations in a class-(iii) model
Note: Pflüger and Südekum (2008) is taken as the underlying example model.
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Figure 12: Evolution of the spatial pattern in Figure 11
Note: The alphabets below the spatial patterns correspond to those in Figure 11.
governedbya relative rise of the local dispersion force. As the importance of distancedeclines
given improvements in transportation access, local congestion overcomes the agglomeration
force and the so-called redispersion occurs.
The evolution of spatial patterns provides richer intuitions. Figure 12 illustrates the
spatial patterns associated with Figure 11 (see also Section 3.2 to understand the figure).
The flat-earth pattern is initially stable (Pattern A); the first bifurcation leads to a four-
centric global dispersion (C), whereas the dispersion associated with the second bifurcation
as a single agglomeration.
42At this point, there is good reason to suspect that, even though seemingly identical, the flat-earth patterns
at the higher and lower levels of τ are very distinct nature. Specifically, one would argue that the number of
agglomerations must be eight (one), instead of zero, at large (low) τ. We shall refrain from these arguments,
however, because the two stages of dispersion are indistinguishable by a mere observation of h.
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is two-centric (E). These transitions are wholly in line with those of Krugman (1991); they
are governed by the gradual decline of the global dispersion force in the model. After
these transitions, evolutionary behavior becomes more interesting; the decline of the global
dispersion force increases the relative importance of the local dispersion force. The two-
centric agglomerations formed in (E) gradually increase their spatial extent (F, G) due to local
dispersion eﬀects combined with relative decline of the global agglomeration force. Further
decline in τ implies a triumph of the global agglomeration force against the global dispersion
force since the latter declines faster than the former. Consequently, the two agglomerations
gradually merge (H, I) to form a monopolar agglomeration (J, K), while maintaining their
spatial extent due to the strong local dispersion force. As relative importance of the local
dispersion force increases further, the gradual expansion of the single agglomeration occurs
(L, M) followed by complete redispersion (N). The rich and intuitive interplay of global and
local scales of agglomeration and dispersion can be studied only in many-region setups.
6 Implications for empirical studies
In the previous sections, we have argued that the explicit consideration of the presence
of many regions, more specifically the diversity in interregional distances, is the key to
explaining the actual spatial pattern of agglomeration. The understanding of agglomeration
and dispersion mechanisms at diﬀerent spatial scales helps us find an appropriate way to
quantify the spatial patterns of agglomeration. It helps develop appropriate specifications
for regression models as well as structural models to identify the causal mechanisms of
regional agglomeration. This section highlights these points by reviewing selected empirical
studies on the relation between transport costs and regional agglomerations.
6.1 Measures of agglomeration
There is a strand of literature concerning the measurement of industrial agglomeration.
Unlike population agglomerations that have been identified in terms of distinct metropolitan
areas or population clusters (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Rozenfeld,
Rybski, Gabaix and Makse, 2011), industrial agglomerations have typically been measured
by an aggregated scalar index (e.g., Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and Overman, 2005;
Brülhart and Traeger, 2005; Mori et al., 2005).
Of the two pioneering indices of industrial agglomeration, that proposed by Ellison and
Glaeser (1997) controlled for the spatial concentration of employment that accrued from
the distribution of employment among establishments, while the other by Duranton and
Overman (2005) resolved spatial aggregation biases that arose from regional data by utilizing
geo-coded micro data of establishments.
28
While these refinementsmay be reasonable, amajor reservation about these scalar indices
is that by construction they do not distinguish spatial scales of agglomeration and dispersion.
With respect to cross-sectional comparisons among industries, this means that there is no
way to distinguish spatial scales at which variations in the index value arise although the
underlying agglomeration mechanisms qualitatively diﬀer at each scale.43 A consequence
of the abstraction from spatial scales is that these indices inevitably neutralize the opposing
responses of agglomeration at global and local scales to a given change in transport costs.
Distinguishing individual agglomerations on a map just like the case of population ag-
glomerations is necessary to separate the eﬀects at diﬀerent spatial scales. Kerr and Komin-
ers (2015) and Mori and Smith (2014) proposed clustering methods designed for economic
agglomerations. Pelleg and Moore (2000), Ishioka (2000) and Brendan and Dueck (2007)
proposed heuristic clustering techniques for general purposes. Our theory suggests that
agglomeration at the global scale is reflected on a smaller number of agglomerations (as
well as a larger spacing between agglomerations), whereas that at the local scale is reflected
on a smaller spatial extent of each individual agglomeration. These spatial properties of
agglomeration can be quantified using the identified clusters.
An advantage of such a clustering approach for industrial agglomerations is that unlike
the case of population agglomeration, one can obtain variations in agglomeration patterns
across industries. Using the clusteringmethod proposed byMori and Smith (2014), Mori and
Smith (2015) indicated a wide variation in the the degrees of agglomeration both at global
and local scales across three-digit manufacturing industries in Japan. The variations across
industries in turn can be utilized to test the theoretical implications on the spatial patterns of
agglomeration, for example, the causal relation among the number, size, and spatial extent
of agglomerations and transport costs. One such application by Mori, Mun and Sakaguchi
(2017) is discussed in the next section.
6.2 Reduced-form regression approaches
We have shown that endogenous agglomeration mechanisms generally do not isolate which
existing agglomerations to grow or decline given an improvement in interregional transport
access. This indeterminacy is due to the underlying second-nature advantage. Nonetheless,
the theory oﬀers a clear prediction regarding the global and local spatial pattern of agglom-
erations. The former prediction is that there is agglomeration at the global scale: the number
of agglomerations decreases, the distance between neighboring agglomerations increases
(reflecting the growing agglomeration shadow), and the sizes of the surviving individual
agglomerations increase (refer to Sections 5.1 and 5.3). The latter prediction is that there is
43Duranton and Overman (2005) distinguished distances between establishments; however, they did not
distinguish between intra- and inter-agglomeration distances.
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dispersion at the local scale: The spatial extent of each individual agglomeration increases, for
example, in the form of suburbanization (refer to Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
In Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 below, we argue that these theoretical predictions are useful
to understand the diverse results from extant empirical studies based on reduced-form
regressions on regional agglomerations. Further, in Section 6.2.3, we discuss the context in
which these predictions can be actually tested.
6.2.1 On the size of an agglomeration
A typical regression model to evaluate the impact of a new transport network on regional
growth has the following form (see, e.g., Redding and Turner, 2015, §20.4, for a survey) :
SIZEit  C0 + C1ACCESSit + C2xi + γit + ηt + ϵit , (6.1)
where SIZEit and ACCESSit represent a measure of agglomeration size and a measure of
interregional transport access, respectively, in region i at year t; xi denotes the region-specific
and year-invariant covariates, γit denotes the region- and year-specific unobserved eﬀect, ηt
denotes the year-specific unobserved eﬀect, ϵit denotes the region- and year-specific error,
and C0, C1 and C2 are coeﬃcients to be estimated, where C1 is of interest here.
The existing literature concerning the relation between agglomeration size and interre-
gional transport access in an individual region shows mixed results. We start from two
studies drawing contrasting conclusions. Faber (2014) investigated the impact of the con-
struction of the nation-wide highway network in China on the agglomerations in peripheral
counties during 1997–2006. Duranton and Turner (2012) studied a similar situation in the
US during 1983–2003; however, they focused on the impact on agglomerations in relatively
large metro areas instead of peripheral alternatives. SIZEit represents the changes in out-
put measures such as the gross domestic product and gross value added as well as that of
population size in a county in the former, while it is the change in metro-area population or
employment in the latter. ACCESSit represents the change in interregional highway accessi-
bility in both cases.44 Their results exhibited a stark diﬀerence: the former (latter) generally
found a significantly negative (positive) estimate of C1 in (6.1), even after controlling for the
initial size of each region.
Yet there are other studies reporting indefinite results. For the Chinese data similar to
that used by Faber (2014), Baum-Snow, Henderson, Turner, Zhang and Brandt (2016, Tables
44In the baseline specification of (6.1) in the study by Faber (2014), ACCESSit represents a binary variable
that takes the value 1 if a given region i is connected by the newly constructed highway at time t, while it is
set to the initial sum of interstate highway length within a metro area (i.e., in 1983) in the study by Duranton
and Turner (2012). In particular, Duranton and Turner (2012) considered ACCESSit as the level of intra-urban
(rather than inter-urban) transport infrastructure. But, we believe that the stock of interstate highways within
a given metro area certainly reflects the level of inter-urban connectivity.
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4 & 5) found insignificant estimates of C1 when both large and small regions along the
network were included in the regression. For the US data similar to that used by Duranton
and Turner (2012), Baum-Snow (2017, Table 5) ran a variant of (6.1) to estimate the impact of
interregional transport access on industry-specific employment in a metro area. However,
the estimated coeﬃcient of C1 was insignificant for all but manufacturing employment; it
was negatively significant for manufacturing employment.45 Thus, the estimated impacts of
interregional transport access on the size of an individual agglomeration vary widely, and
there is no consensus even on the sign of the impacts.
From the knowledge of endogenous agglomeration mechanisms obtained in this paper,
behind the incoherent regression results, we suspect the ignorance of the eﬀects of interre-
gional transport costs on the spatial distribution of agglomerations. What happened appears
to be an agglomeration at the global scale toward a smaller number of larger regions. In
the study by Faber (2014), the decline of peripheral regions is a mirror image of the growth
of core regions excluded in his regression.46 It is similarly expected that in the study by
Duranton and Turner (2012), the growth of large metro areas is a mirror image of the decline
in the peripheral areas excluded in their regression, although there is no explicit discussion
on this aspect in their paper.
Although the regional variation in interregional transport access would certainly influ-
ence that in agglomeration size, this relation could be correctly identified only after control-
ling for the economy-wide eﬀects of improved transport access on the overall spatial distri-
bution of agglomerations. In class (i) models, an improvement of interregional accessibility
at a given location does not necessarily result in a size growth or decline of agglomeration
at that location (refer to Section 5.1). It is thus natural to obtain an insignificant average
eﬀect of improved transport access for both large and small regions along the new transport
network as in Baum-Snow et al. (2016, Tables 4 & 5). Moreover, both Faber (2014, Table 6)
and Duranton and Turner (2012, Table E2) found evidence for the agglomeration shadow,
i.e., larger distance from the nearest major agglomeration tends to promote the growth of a
region, which further suggests the relevance of class-(i) mechanisms.47
45Similar studies by Storeygard (2016) and Yamasaki (2017) established a positive relation between interre-
gional transport access and regional agglomeration in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa for the 2002–2008 period
and Japan for the 1885–1920 period, respectively. Since the the focus of these studies is the early stage of
economic development, their results may not be directly comparable to those of Faber (2014) and Duranton and
Turner (2012), as well as to our theoretical results. For example, the latter paper investigated the situation in
which industrialization took place along with the introduction of railways in response to the spread of steam
power in Japan. But, the decomposition of the causal relationship among industrialization, improvement in
interregional transport access and urbanization is not obvious.
46It is also pointed out by Baum-Snow et al. (2016, Tables 4 & 5) that there was a significant increase in
agglomeration size in large regions in the China case.
47In the studybyDuranton andTurner (2012), themonotonic relationship between the size of ametro area and
the level of inter-urban transport infrastructure in (6.1) is rationalized by assuming an open-city specification
in the underlying theoretical model. But, the significant urban shadow eﬀect among the included metro areas
casts doubt on this justification.
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If our reasoningwere correct, the discrepancy between the actual SIZEit and the estimatedSIZEit in these regressions is likely to be systematic. In this case, the “clear” estimated impacts
of interregional transport development based on a selected set of regions (e.g., relatively large
or small regions or metro areas) could result in misleading policy implications.48
6.2.2 On the spatial extent of an agglomeration
The same specification (6.1)makes perfect sensewhen it comes to evaluating local dispersion.
Baum-Snow (2007) and Baum-Snow et al. (2017) presented evidence for local dispersion as
a consequence of improved interregional transport access in the cases of US metro areas
for 1950–1990 and Chinese prefectures during 1990–2010, respectively.49 In these studies,
SIZEit denotes the change in the population/production size of the central area within a
larger region i (the metro area for the US and the province for China). They both reported
a significantly negative estimated coeﬃcient of C1 given an improvement of interregional
access after controlling for the growth of each region.50, 51 Their findings are consistent with
our results on local dispersion (in sections 5.2 and 5.3).52
Recall the population agglomeration at the global scale and dispersion at the local scale in
response to the development of the nation-wide highway and high-speed railway networks
in Japan after 1970 discussed in Section 1 (and Appendix A). Empirical evidence suggests
that China and the US experienced essentially the same phenomena.
6.2.3 On the spatial patterns of agglomeration
Finally, we explore the possibility of testing our theoretical predictions on the spatial pat-
terns of agglomerationsmentioned above rather than testing hypotheses about an individual
agglomeration using the regression models of type (6.1). For population agglomerations,
we typically have only a single set of agglomerations at a given point in time so that hy-
48It may be also important to include more extensive regional variations in interregional transport access to
pin down the regions in which agglomerations grow. Among the possible asymmetries, those of particular
importance are the locations of major terminals and modal intersections as well as their historical order of
development that arise often from policy intensions rather than from geographical advantages. An explicit
consideration of such exogenous evolution of transport network will make it possible to evaluate the causality
between transport network development and population agglomeration.
49Garcia-López (2012) andGarcia-López, Holl and Viladecans-Marsal (2015) conducted similar studies using
Spanish data.
50As discussed in these studies, their results of local dispersion can also be interpreted as suburbanization
in response to improved intra-urban transport infrastructure in classical urban economic theory (e.g., Alonso,
1964).
51Faber (2014, Table 5 and Figure 4) showed a related evidence that agglomeration relatively proceeds in
regions at a certain distance (around 100–150km) from the highways rather than those along the highways.
52Baum-Snow (2017) extended the work of Baum-Snow (2007) by replacing the outcome variable in (6.1) with
the local dispersion (or suburbanization) of employment in each industry instead of population and showed
that there are variations in the extent of local dispersion across industries.
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potheses concerning their spatial distribution are not testable. However, such tests become
possible by considering an individual industry as a unit of observation. If a distinct set of
agglomerations can be identified for each industry, we have variations in the spatial patterns
of agglomerations across industries at a given point in time. As a recent attempt, Mori et
al. (2017) adopted the clustering framework developed by Mori and Smith (2014) and used
the data on Japanese manufacturing three-digit industries during 1995–2015. Through this,
they have shown that the number of agglomerations decreases (i.e., agglomeration at the
global scale proceeds) and the average areal size of individual agglomerations increases
(i.e., dispersion at the local scale proceeds) in response to a decrease in the industry-specific
sensitivity to transport costs: the transport cost per unit distance and unit value of output.53
In their study, by setting a unit of observation to an individual industry, the variation across
industries made it possible to directly test the two predictions from our theoretical results
mentioned above on the spatial patterns of agglomerations.
To sum up, knowledge of the behavior of general economic geography models brings
together the seemingly unrelated pieces of empirical evidence on agglomeration patterns.
Our interpretation of the results from the existing literature seems to suggest a strong rel-
evance of endogenous agglomeration mechanisms to the observed regional variations in
agglomeration size.
6.3 Structural model-based approaches
Wenow turn to the structuralmodel-based approach to evaluate the causal eﬀects of regional
agglomerations summarized by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017, §3). In this approach,
perhaps one of the most popular approaches in quantitative spatial economics, the basic
premise is that the primary source of the regional variation in agglomeration size is the
heterogeneity in exogenous (or first-nature) regional advantages rather than endogenous (or
second-nature) advantages considered in this paper. Thus, given the exogenous productivity
or residential amenity diﬀerence across regions, a larger population of a given region is
always associated with higher exogenous productivity or amenity in that region.
Redding and Sturm (2008) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) employed the first nature-
based approach to study regional agglomerations. A remarkable feature of these models
is that they not only rely on exogenous advantages in explaining agglomeration patterns
but also incorporate agglomeration externalities to the extent that the unique equilibrium is
53This definition of the sensitivity to transport costs is an empirical counterpart of the iceberg transport costs
in our theoretical models.
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guaranteed (so that the tractability of the model is preserved).54, 55 This subtle situation has
been realized by adopting class (ii) models. As shown in Section 5.2, these models have a
parameter range in which agglomeration diseconomies dominate agglomeration economies
independently of the level of transport costs. This special property of class (ii) models is
due to the independence of local dispersion forces on the distance structure of the model. In
this context, the model parameters are calibrated to replicate the relevant regional variations
(such as regional population sizes) in the absence (or presence) of a given treatment such
as transport development; then the counterfactual regional variations are derived in the
presence (or absence) of the treatment given these calibrated parameter values.
There are two caveats in understanding the implications obtained from the results of this
approach.
First, although agglomeration externalities account for a part of the regional variations,
most variations appear to be absorbed by the structural residuals. Consider the study by
Redding and Sturm (2008) for example. Using a many-region extension of the Helpman
(1998) model, they quantified the impact of the change in market accessibility in Germany
before and after the division/reunification of the country after the war. To determine the
time invariant set of parameter values, their model was calibrated to fit city size distributions
in the prewar 1939 Germany. If the log of actual city size is regressed on the log of the
unobserved amenity, i.e., the structural residuals, one can immediately find that most of the
variation in city size is explained by these residuals, as shown in Figure 13, in which the
dashed line indicates the fitted line by OLS:
log(Li/L)  −7.191(0.210) + 1.587(0.050) log(Aˆi) , adj.R
2
 0.896 , (6.2)
where Li and L denote the population size of city i and the average city size in 1939 Ger-
many, respectively, and Aˆi denotes the estimated unobserved amenity (i.e., the variation
unexplained by the model) in city i. Standard errors are in the parentheses.56 Thus, 90% of
the variation in city size is unexplained by the model and fixed exogenously in their counter-
factual exercises. While it is not surprising given that there is no possibility of endogenous
agglomeration in this setup, this result indicates that the structure of their model itself plays
only a small role (10% at maximum) in explaining the treatment eﬀect.
Second, their predictions of treatment eﬀects crucially depend on specific feature of the
underlying economic geography models. In particular, in the class (ii) models, the reduction
54Redding (2016) andMonte et al. (2016) extended the work of Redding and Sturm (2008) by adding diﬀerent
sources of exogenous location-fixed factors.
55The majority of the structural model-based studies for a regional economy involve no agglomeration
externalities (see, e.g., Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016; Baum-Snow et al., 2016; Alder, 2016; Caliendo, Parro,
Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2016).
56The data for the regression are available from the online appendix for Redding and Sturm (2008).
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Figure 13: The relationship between city sizes and the estimated unobserved amenities in Redding
and Sturm (2008)
of interregional transport costs reduces each regional agglomeration caused by the first-
nature advantage of the region and promotes local dispersion. This causal relation has
been demonstrated by a numerical counterfactual exercise in the study by Redding and
Rossi-Hansberg (2017, §3.9). In fact, it can be formally shown (see Appendix D) that this
scale-down eﬀect is a general property of class (ii) models, although there are certain cases
in which local landownership mitigates the eﬀect by counteracting congestion externalities.
But, if class (i) models were used instead, even in the parameter range in which no
endogenous agglomeration occurs (as in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, §3), the sign
of the treatment eﬀect will reverse, i.e., agglomeration externalities would scale up the first-
nature advantage (see Appendix D for a formal proof). The resulting implications thus
become opposite depending on the choice of dispersion force to be included in the model.
Thus, even in the context in which first-nature heterogeneity plays a primary role, the
knowledge of endogenous agglomeration and dispersion mechanisms is crucial to under-
stand the logic and direction of the treatment eﬀect. For that purpose, our stylized analytical
framework appears to be useful.
More recent structural approaches have shifted to accommodate multiple equilibria with
endogenous agglomerations (e.g., Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2017; Nagy, 2017). In
that case, class (ii) models are no longer useful as they can endogenously generate at most a
unimodal agglomeration. To explain both multiple agglomerations and local dispersion by
endogenous mechanisms, one needs a model of either class (iii) or of a more general class
that was not treated in this paper. We briefly touch on these issues in Section 7 in delineating
future directions for research.
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we established a formal classification of economic geography models in terms
of model-specific spatial patterns of agglomeration. By allowing for the presence of many
regions, the spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion is made explicit unlike the two-
region setupormany-region setupwithout interregional space. Inparticular, twodispersions
at high and low transport costs that look identical in a two-region setup turned out to diﬀer
and take place at global and local spatial scales, respectively. In fact, when dispersion
proceeds at the local scale, typically, agglomeration proceeds at the same time but at the
global scale and vice versa.
Our theoretical results indicated a new direction for future empirical research based on
endogenous agglomerations. First, the contrasting agglomeration and dispersion behaviors
at diﬀerent spatial scales suggest the need for distinguishing individual agglomerations
rather than measuring agglomeration by a scalar index. Second, endogenous agglomeration
and dispersion mechanisms generally do not isolate the growth and decline of individual
agglomerations and can only provide insights on their spatial patterns. Our new results
regarding the impact of transport development on the spatial patterns of agglomeration
could provide a unified interpretation of a variety of existing results from reduced-form
regressions on regional agglomerations. Furthermore, we have shown that our analytical
framework is useful for obtaining formal predictions of treatment eﬀects in structural model-
based analyses that aim to explain the agglomeration patterns.
But, the relatively simple classificationof the spatial scale of agglomeration anddispersion
in our paper owes to the simple structure of the models considered. Below, we discuss
possible future directions of theoretical research to account for richermore realistic variations
in agglomeration and dispersion across diﬀerent spatial scales.
There are at least threemajor directions of research that could be pursued. The first possi-
ble extension is to distinguish location incentives between firms and consumers/workers as
is traditionally done in the urban economics literature (e.g., Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Ota and
Fujita, 1993; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). In all the models considered in this paper, the
location incentive of firms and that of consumers/workers coincide. This simplification may
be justifiable when the global pattern of agglomeration (in particular, sizes and locations
of cities) is the subject of the study. But, their distinction becomes crucial for explaining
the location patterns within a city. There are recent attempts, for example, by Ahlfeldt et
al. (2015) and Owens et al. (2017) in this direction. These models typically abstract from
the inter-city/regional interactions in an open-city setup. But, possible equilibrium patterns
and their stability properties in this class of models are still not well known and could thus
represent a fruitful avenue for future research.
The second possibility is to consider diﬀerent transport cost structures by industries.
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For instance, Fujita and Krugman (1995) introduced transport costs for land-intensive rural
(agricultural) goods along with that of urban goods. In the presence of rural goods that are
costly to transport, the delivered price for such goods is lower in regions farther away from
the agglomerations, which generates dispersion force. This is similar to the local dispersion
force in that even a small deviation from an urban agglomeration will decrease the price of
rural goods and increase the payoﬀ of the deviant. But, the advantage of dispersion persists
outside the agglomeration, i.e., it depends on the distance structure of themodel. This type of
dispersion force will lead to the formation of an industrial belt, a continuum of agglomeration
associated with multiple atoms of agglomeration as demonstrated by simulations in the
studies byMori (1997) and Ikeda, Murota, Akamatsu and Takayama (2017b). But, the formal
characterization of industrial belts remains to be done.
Finally, another possible extension is to incorporate diversity in increasing returns, lead-
ing to the diversity in spatial scale of agglomeration and dispersion and to the diversity
in the size of agglomeration. In all the models with global dispersion force considered in
this paper, the sizes of agglomerations in equilibrium are basically the same (refer to the
simulation exercises in Section 5.1) since each model has only one type of increasing re-
turns. This is counterfactual as actual city size distributions are quite diverse and are well
known to roughly follow the power law.57 Initial attempts to account for the diversity in
increasing returns by introducing multiple increasing-returns industries have been made in
the context of the NEG models by, e.g., Fujita et al. (1999b), Tabuchi and Thisse (2011), and
Hsu (2012)’s spatial competition model. Alternatively, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009),
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014), Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), Desmet et al. (2017),
and Nagy (2017) incorporated dynamic externalities through endogenous innovation and
spillover eﬀects.
57The models considered in this paper are consistent with heterogeneously sized agglomerations in equilib-
rium; but, it is not possible to replicate the high diversity of city sizes seen in reality.
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A The development of transport network and urban agglom-
eration patterns in Japan for 1970-2010
To compare the urban agglomeration patterns in Japan, we define an urban agglomeration (UA) as
the set of contiguous 1km-by-1km cells with population density at least 1000/km2 and the total
population at least 10000.58 (Basic results below remain the same for alternative threshold densities
and population.) For the part of Japan that are contiguous by roads to at least one of the four major
islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu), 538 and 521 UAs are identified, and are depicted
in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 14 for years 1970 and 2010, respectively, where the warmer color
indicates a larger population. They together account for 64% and 77% of the total population in 1970
and 2010, respectively. Thus, there is substantial 20% increase in the urban concentration in these
forty years. Of the 538 UAs that existed in 1970, 359 have survived, while 59 disappeared and 120
have been integrated to other UAs by 2010. Of the 521 UAs that existed in 2010, 162 were newly
formed after 1970 (including those split from the existing UAs).59
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 14 show the highway and high-speed railway network in use as of 1970
and 2010, respectively. The comparison of these panels indicates an obvious substantial expansion of
these networks during these forty years as mentioned in the text.
Panels (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 15 show the distributions of the rates of population growth, areal
size growth and population density growth of individual UAs for the set of the 359 UAs that have
survived throughout the forty year period. A UA experienced on average 34% (111%) of population
growth, 107% (131%) of areal size growth and−36% (18%) of population density growth, respectively,
where the numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations.
As a larger share of population have concentrated in a smaller number of UAs in 2010 than in
1970, the spatial size of an individual UA has doubled on average. But, these spatial expansions
are not simply due to the shortage of available land in UAs. Note that the population density (after
controlling for the growth of total population) decreased by one-third on average. We take this as
an evidence of global concentration with local dispersion under the improvement of interregional
transport access.
58Population count data are obtained fromStatistics Bureau,Ministry of InternalAﬀairs andCommunications
of Japan (1970, 2010).
59A pair of UAs in two diﬀerent time points are considered to be the sameUA if the most populated cell of one
of the UAs is contained in the other UA, and vice versa. If the most populated cell of a UA in 1970 is contained
in a UA in 2010, but not vice versa, then the former UA is taken to be integrated into the latter UA. If the most
populated cell of a UA in 2010 is contained in a UA in 1970, but not vice versa, then the former UA is taken to
have split from the latter UA. If the most populated cell of a UA in 1970 is not contained in any UA in 2010, the
former UA is taken to have disappeared. Similarly, if the most populated cell of a UA in 2010 is not contained in
any UA in 1970, then the former UA is taken to be newly formed.
45
(a) Urban agglomerations in 1970 (b) Urban agglomerations in 2010
(c) Highway and high-speed railway network in 1970 (d) Highway and high-speed railway network in 2010
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Figure 14: Urban agglomerations and transport network in Japan
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Figure 15: Growth rates of the sizes of urban agglomerations in Japan
46
B Racetrack economy and simplification of stability analysis
The friction matrix D for a racetrack economy is a circulant matrix. In this appendix, we first review
some useful properties of circulant matrices. Then, we see how stability analysis of the flat-earth
pattern on a symmetric racetrack economy is simplified by these properties.
B.1 Facts on properties of circulant matrices
A circulant matrix C of dimension K is defined as a K-by-K square matrix of the form
C ≡

c0 c1 c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1
cK−1 c0 c1 c2 · · · cK−2
cK−2
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . c2
c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1 c0 c1
c1 c2 · · · cK−2 cK−1 c0

. (B.1.1)
The elements of each row of C are identical to those of the previous row, but are moved one position
to the right and wrapped around. The whole circulant is evidently determined by the first row vector
c  (ci)K−1i0 . Circulant matrices are known to satisfy the following properties (see, e.g., Horn and
Johnson, 2012):
Lemma B.1. LetC1 andC2 be circulant matrices. Then, their sumC1+C2 and productC1C2 also are
circulants. Also, they are commutative, i.e., C1C2  C2C1. Let C3 be a nonsingular circulant matrix.
Then, its inverse C−13 also is a circulant.
Lemma B.2. Let C be a K-by-K circulant matrix. Let Z  [z jk] be the discrete Fourier transformation
(DFT) matrix where z jk  K−1/2 exp[iθ jk] with θ ≡ 2pi/K and i ≡
√−1. Then, C is diagonalized by
the similarity transformation by Z as Z∗CZ  diag[λ]where ∗ denotes the conjugate transpose.
λ  (λi) are the eigenvalues of C. The kth eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector of C are λk and
the kth row of the DFT matrix Z, respectively. Furthermore, λ is given by the DFT of the first row
vector c of C as λ  K1/2Zc⊤.
Remark B.1. It follows that all K-by-K circulant matrices share the same eigenvectors.
Consider a matrix A that is defined by a matrix polynomial of a nonsingular circulant matrix C:
A  c0I + c1C + c2C2 + · · · . (B.1.2)
Thanks to Lemma B.1 and B.2, one has that (i) A is a circulant matrix (note that I is also a circulant)
and thus that (ii) its eigenvalues µ ≡ (µi) is given by those of C, λ, by the relation
diag[µ]  Z∗AZ  Z∗(c0I + c1C + c2C2 + · · · )Z  c0I + c1 diag[λ] + c2 diag[λ]2 + · · · , (B.1.3)
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or, in the element-wise manner,
µk  c0 + c1λk + c2λ2k + · · · . (B.1.4)
Remark B.2. If C is in addition symmetric, A is also symmetric. It implies that the eigenvalues
λ  (λk) and µ  (µk) as well as their associated eigenvectors are all real.
B.2 Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the friction matrix
We derive eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the friction matrix for later use. To simplify notation,
we define r ∈ (0, 1) that represents the freeness of transport between two consecutive regions on the
racetrack: r(τ) ≡ exp[−τ/K] where we rescale τ so that the circumferential length of the economy is
fixed. From the definition of r, it is a monotonically decreasing function of the transportation cost
(technology) parameter τ and hence r and τ are mutually interchangeable. We shall use r as the
transport technology parameter in the present appendix. Using r, one has di j  rℓi j .
For analyzing specific models, it is useful to derive the eigenvalues of the row-normalized friction
matrix D¯ ≡ D/d with d ≡ ∑ j∈K d0, j . We note that every row has exactly the same row sum
because D is circulant. It turns out that on a racetrack economy, D is a circulant matrix since
di j  rℓi j  rℓi+1, j+1  di+1, j+1 for all i , j (modK for indices). Furthermore,D is symmetric and real and
hence all the eigenvalues and eigenvectors are real. The analytical expressions of the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of D¯ are available (Akamatsu et al., 2012):
Lemma B.3. Let fk(r) be the kth eigenvalue of the row-normalized friction matrix D¯ for a racetrack
economy with K regions. Assume that K is a multiple of four. DefineΨk(r) > 0 and Ψ¯(r) > 0 by
Ψk(r) ≡ 1 − r
2
1 − 2{cos[θk]}r + r2 , Ψ¯(r) ≡
1 + rK/2
1 − rK/2 (B.2.1)
with θ  2pi/K. Then, { fk(r)} is given by
fk(r) 

Ψk(r)ΨK/2(r) (k: even)
Ψk(r)ΨK/2(r)Ψ¯(r) (k: odd)
k  0, 1, 2, . . . , K/2, (B.2.2)
where k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1 are of multiplicity two. The associated eigenvectors are
η0  K1/2 cos[0])  K1/2(1, 1, . . . , 1), (B.2.3)
η+k  K
1/2(cos[θki]), η−k  K1/2(sin[θki]) k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1, (B.2.4)
ηK/2  K1/2 cos[pii])  K1/2(1,−1, 1,−1, . . . , 1,−1) (B.2.5)
where η+k and η
−
k are the two eigenvectors associated to fk(r) (k  1, 2, . . . , K/2 − 1).
Remark B.3. For each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ K/2 − 1, we can focus on a single eigenvector of the form
ηk  η
+
k  K
1/2(cos[θki]) since we do not distinguish rotationally symmetric patterns; any linear
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combination of η+k and η
−
k reduces to a single trigonometric curve with the samewave length as them.
See Figure 2 and Figure 3 for illustration. Note that we drop the constant K1/2 in the main text
for slight simplification. In particular, f0(r)  1, f1(r)  (1− r)/(1+ r) and fK/2(r)  {(1− r)/(1+ r)}2.
Furthermore, employing the analytical expression of { fk(r)} in Lemma B.3, one shows:
Corollary B.1. { fk(r)} satisfy the following properties if K is a multiple of four.
1. Every fk(r) is a monotonically decreasing function of r except for f0(r)  1.
2. For all r, { fk(r)} with k  0, 1, 2, . . . , K/2 are ordered as
1  f0 > f2 > · · · > f2k > · · · > fK/2 ,
1 > f1 > f3 > · · · > f2k+1 > · · · > fK/2−1.
(B.2.6)
with f1(r) > f2(r) and fK/2−1(r) > fK/2(r).
The second property yields that mink{ fk(r)}  fK/2(r) and maxk≥1{ fk(r)}  f1(r) for all r. We note
that every fk(r(τ)) (k ≥ 1) as a function of τ is monotonically increasing.
Example B.1. In a racetrack economy with K  4, the friction matrixD is given by
D 

1 r r2 r
1 r r2
1 r
Sym. 1

. (B.2.7)
Its row sum is d  1+ r + r2 + r  (1+ r)2 and thus D¯  D/(1+ r)2. The eigenvalues of D¯ are given by
f0  1, f1 
1 − r
1 + r
, f2 
(
1 − r
1 + r
)2
. (B.2.8)
The associated eigenvectors are η0  2−1(1, 1, 1, 1), η+1  2−1(1, 0,−1, 0), η−1  2−1(0, 1, 0,−1), and
η2  2
−1(1,−1, 1,−1).
B.3 Representing the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯) by those of D¯
We assume that the payoﬀ function v is diﬀerentiable. For simplicity we assume that v is defined for
the nonnegative orthant RK+ .
Assumption B.1. The payoﬀ function v : RK+ → RK is continuously diﬀerentiable.
Given v, we define a spatial equilibrium by the following variational inequality problem (VIP):
[VIP] Find h∗ ∈ D such that v(h∗) · (h − h∗) ≤ 0 for all h ∈ D . (B.3.1)
Definition B.1. A spatial equilibrium is a solution to [VIP].
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Alternative equivalent definition of long-run equilibria is found in the main text.
The flat-earth equilibrium h¯ ≡ (h , h , . . . , h) with h ≡ H/K is obviously a spatial equilibrium;
because v(h¯)  v¯1with the uniform level of payoﬀ v¯, we have v(h¯)·(h−h¯)  v¯1 ·(h−h¯)  v¯(H−H)  0
for all h ∈ D. In preparation for Appendix B.4 below, we discuss the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium. Appendix C demonstrates that, at the flat-
earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we can express the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function
in the following way
∇v(h¯)  G0(D¯)G(D¯), (B.3.2)
G(D¯) ≡ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 , (B.3.3)
where G0(·) and G(·) are interpreted as matrix polynomials. G0(D¯) is a positive definite matrix
defined by D¯. Since D¯ is circulant, ∇v(h¯) also is circulant. Thus, as discussed, we can express the kth
eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯), ek , by that of D¯, fk , in terms of a model-dependent functions G0( f ) and G( f )
ek  G0( fk)G( fk) (B.3.4)
where G0( fk) and G( fk) are the kth eigenvalue of G0(D¯) and G(D¯), respectively. The associated
eigenvectors are the same as those of D¯. As we have G0( fk) > 0, for the purpose of examining the
sign of ek , we only need to check that of G( fk).
B.4 Stability analysis of the flat-earth equilibrium
Employing the above results, this section derives the results presented in Sections 2.3 and 3.
Notations. Let D ≡ {h ∈ RK | h · 1  H, hi ≥ 0} denote the set of possible spatial patterns. Also,
in relation to D, let TD(h) ≡ {z ∈ RK | z  α(y − h) for some y ∈ D and α ≥ 0} denote the tangent
cone of D at h ∈ D, and TD ≡ {z ∈ RK | z · 1  0} denote the tangent space of D. Note that for any
h ∈ intD, we have TD(h)  TD becauseD is a convex subset of a hyperplane.
B.4.1 Derivations for Section 2.3
We summarize our assumptions on the dynamic F as follows, where with a notational abuse we let
F (h)  F (h, v(h)). We assume that F is defined for the nonnegative orthant RK+ .
Assumption B.2. The dynamic F : RK+ → RK satisfies the following properties.
1. (conservation) the total mass of mobile agents is invariant, i.e., F (h) ∈ TD(h) for all h ∈ D.
2. (diﬀerentiability) F (h) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to h and v(h) inD.
3. (stationarity at spatial equilibria) if h∗ is a spatial equilibrium, then F (h∗)  0.
4. (positive correlation) v(h) · F (h) > 0 for all h ∈ D such that F (h) , 0.
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Example B.2. The set of dynamics that satisfy Assumption B.2 includes the replicator dynamic (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978), which is the leading instance of the general class of imitative dynamics, the Brown–
von Neumann–Nash dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950; Nash, 1951), which is an instance of
excess payoﬀ dynamics, and, for interior equilibria, the projection dynamic (Dupuis andNagurney, 1993).
For more examples, refer to Sandholm (2010).
Consider a small deviation η ∈ TD(h∗)  TD at an interior equilibrium h∗ ∈ intD. By conserva-
tion we must have F (h∗ + η) ∈ TD for such η; it follows that
F (h∗ + η)  F (h∗) + ∇F (h∗)η + o(‖η‖)  ∇F (h∗)η + o(‖η‖) ∈ TD . (B.4.1)
Since J ≡ ∇F (h∗) maps all η ∈ TD into TD, J defines a linear map from TD to TD. Thus, the
stability analysis of an interior equilibrium h∗ reduces to examining the eigenvalues of the restricted
linear map J : TD → TD. We thus focus on deviations η that live in TD (i.e., η such that η · 1  0).
In eﬀect, we can ignore g0, which is the associated eigenvalue for η0 ≡ (1, 1, . . . , 1) because η0 is the
basis for TD⊥ (the orthogonal space of TD, which is one-dimensional).
For general isolated interior equilibria h∗ ∈ intD, we have v(h∗)  v¯1 with the uniform level of
payoﬀ v¯ and F (h∗)  0, implying that v(h∗) ·F (h∗)  0. Because h∗ is an isolated interior equilibrium,
the positive correlation property of F requires that there is a neighborhood O ⊂ D of h∗ such that
v(h) ·F (h) > 0 for all h ∈ O \ {h∗}. Also, by diﬀerentiability of v and F in intD, we can expand v and
F in the vicinity of the equilibrium; that is, for suﬃciently small η such that h∗+η ∈ D (i.e., η ∈ TD),
the positive correlation property is equivalent to the condition
(v¯1 + ∇v(h∗)η) · (F (h∗) + Jη)  (∇v(h∗)η) · (Jη) > 0. (B.4.2)
Note that (Jη) · 1  0 because Jη ∈ TD for all η ∈ TD.
In (B.4.2), suppose that η  ηk , where ηk (k ≥ 1) is the kth eigenvector of the restricted linear map
J with associated eigenvalue being gk . Then, with h  h∗ + ηk we have
(Jηk) · (∇v(h∗)ηk)  (gkηk) · (∇v(h∗)ηk)  gk(η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk) > 0. (B.4.3)
which shows that if gk and ηk are real (in particular, if J is symmetric)
sgn[gk]  sgn[η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk]  sgn
[∑
i∈K
δVizi
]
where δVi ≡
∑
j∈K
∂vi(h∗)
∂h j
z j (B.4.4)
as in (2.1), where for simplicity we let zi ≡ ηk ,i .
B.4.2 Derivations for Section 3
At the flat-earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we have stronger results. First, because J and
∇v(h¯) are both symmetric and circulant, the eigenvectors for the two matrices are both real and are
the same (refer to Appendix B.1). Thus, letting ek be the kth eigenvalue of ∇v(h¯) which is associated
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to the eigenvector ηk  (ηk ,i)  (K1/2 cos[θki]) (see Lemma B.3), (B.4.3) further implies that
gk
(
η⊤k ∇v(h∗)ηk
)
 gk
(
ekη⊤k ηk
)
 gkek ‖ηk ‖2  gkek > 0. (B.4.5)
Noting that gk and ek are real, at the flat-earth equilibrium in a racetrack economy, we have
sgn[gk]  sgn[ek] (B.4.6)
for all k ≥ 1. For convenience, we introduce a notation to describe the above situation.
Definition B.2. LetA andB be two K-by-K symmetric circulant matrices. ByA ≃ B, we denote that
A  CB with a symmetric circulant matrix C that is positive definite relative to TD.
Observe that if we have J ≃ B for some symmetric circulant matrix B, we may study eigenvalues
of B instead of those of J to examine the stability of h¯. Because J  CB and J , C, and B are
circulant, employing the properties of circulant matrices we have gk  ckbk with ck and bk being the
eigenvalues ofC andB, respectively; also, because J ,B, andC are symmetric, gk , bk , and ck are real
(Appendix B.1). Since C is symmetric, circulant, and positive definite relative to TD, we have ck > 0
for k ≥ 1. In sum, it follows that sgn[gk]  sgn[bk] for k ≥ 1. We summarize as follows.
Lemma B.4. Assume that the dynamic F satisfy Assumption B.2 and consider the flat-earth equi-
librium h¯ on a racetrack economy. Then, J ≡ ∇F (h¯) and ∇v(h¯) are both symmetric and circulant.
Furthermore, we have J ≃ ∇v(h¯).
Thus, for the stability analysis of h¯, we may study the signs of the eigenvalues ek (k ≥ 1) of ∇v(h¯)
because we have sgn[gk]  sgn[ek]. In particular, using our notation, J satisfies
J ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 (B.4.7)
at the flat-earth equilibrium (see Appendix B.3). Thus, the stability of h¯ is governed by the model-
dependent function G(·) in (B.3.3) because (B.4.7) implies
sgn[gk]  sgn[G( fk)], (B.4.8)
G( fk) ≡ c0 + c1 fk + c2 f 2k . (B.4.9)
Furthermore, not only the signs but also the magnitudes of the eigenvalues {gk} and {ek} of J
and ∇v(h¯) are often related in a much stronger way.
Observation B.1. For canonical evolutionary dynamics in the literature, it often follows that gk  c¯ek
for k ≥ 1with a common, positive constant c¯.
Example B.3. The replicator dynamic, which is the de facto standard dynamic in the NEG literature, is
defined by
Fi(h) ≡ hi{vi(h) − v¯(h)}, (B.4.10)
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where v¯(h) ≡ (1/H)∑ j∈K v j(h)h j is the average payoﬀ all over the regions. One has
∇F (h)  ψ0(h) + ψ1(h)∇v(h) (B.4.11)
with ψ0(h) and ψ1(h) defined by ψ0(h) ≡ diag[v(h) − v¯(h)1] − (1/H)hv(h)⊤ and ψ1(h) ≡ diag[h](I −
(1/H)1h⊤), respectively. It follows that, at the flat-earth equilibrium, ψ0(h¯)  −v¯E and ψ1(h¯) 
h (I −E), where E ≡ (1/K)11⊤ is a K-by-K matrix whose elements are all 1/K. It implies that
gk 

−v¯ < 0 if k  0,
hek if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
(B.4.12)
where {ek} are the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯). Therefore, J ≃ ∇v(h¯) as well as c¯  h.
B.4.3 Extension: Taste heterogeneities
Local stability of equilibria in models with idiosyncratic taste heterogeneity á la Murata (2003) and
Redding (2016) can be analyzed by employing the associated perturbed best response dynamics as is
done by Akamatsu et al. (2012) for logit equilibrium under the logit dynamic. To be precise, for
models with randomized preference v˜(h) and the associated perturbed best response dynamic F˜ ,
we have J  ∇F˜ (h¯, v˜(h¯)) ≃ Φ∇v(h¯) − ηI where η is a positive constant that reflects magnitude of
heterogeneity and Φ is the projection matrix onto TD. v(h) is interpreted to be the homogeneous
part of the underlying payoﬀ function v˜(h) (see Sandholm, 2010). Assuming idiosyncratic taste
heterogeneity is thus mathematically equivalent to incorporating an extra local dispersion force.60
Example B.4 (Logit equilibrium). Consider a logit equilibrium (an equivalent of an equilibriumunder
idiosyncratic multiplicative Fréchet shock in the payoﬀ function) with the noise parameter η. It is
standard that the equilibrium condition is
hi  Pi(h)H, where Pi(h) ≡ exp[−vi(h)/η]∑
j∈K exp[−v j(h)/η] . (B.4.13)
The logit dynamic is defiled by
Fi(h)  HPi(h) − hi . (B.4.14)
At h¯, for finite values of η we have
J  η−1Φ∇v(h¯) − I ≃Φ∇v(h¯) − ηI . (B.4.15)
Observe that η →∞ implies J  −I, which indicates that h¯ is always stable; it is intuitive that under
suﬃcient heterogeneity on the side of the preference of mobile agent, the equilibrium is unique.
60Interested readers should consult Chapter 8 of Sandholm (2010) for local stability analysis via linearization
of evolutionary dynamics in population games as well as the consequences of assuming random utility models
on the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic J at an equilibrium.
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C Analyses of economic geography models
In this appendix, we derive the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium,
∇v(h¯), for the models included in Table 1. As discussed in the main text and as in Appendix B above,
this suﬃces for our purpose. Table 2 at the end of this appendix summarizes the exact mappings
from each model to the coeﬃcients of a model-dependent function G( f )  c0 + c1 f + c2 f 2. We note
that as soon as one has analytical expression of G( f ), she will be able to derive break points with
respect to relevant parameters and study implications of the model.
C.1 Krugman (1991) (Km) model
Following Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999a), this section introduces a many-region version of
Krugman (1991)’s seminal model in line with our context.
Assumptions. There are K discrete regions whose set is denoted by K . There are two types
of workers: unskilled and skilled. Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor. The total
endowments of skilled and unskilled workers are H and L, respectively. The skilled workers are
mobile across regions; hi ≥ 0 denotes their population in region i, whence h ≡ (hi)i∈K is the spatial
pattern of them across the regions. Throughout Appendix C, D ≡ {h ∈ RK | h · 1  H, hi ≥ 0}
denotes the set of all possible spatial distributions of mobile (skilled) workers. The unskilled workers
are immobile; their population in region i is denoted by li .
There are two industrial sectors: agriculture (abbreviated as A) and manufacturing (abbreviated
as M). The A-sector is perfectly competitive and a unit input of unskilled labor is required to produce
one unit of goods. We choose A-sector goods as the numéraire. TheM-sector is modeled by the Dixit–
Stiglitz monopolistic competition. The M-sector goods are horizontally diﬀerentiated and produced
under increasing returns to scale using skilled labor as input.
The goods of both sectors are transported. Transportation of A-sector goods is frictionless, while
transportation ofM-sector goods is of iceberg form. For each unit of M-sector goods transported from
region i to j, only a fraction 1/τi j arrives where τi j > 1 for i , j and τii  1.
Preference. All workers share an identical preference over both M- and A-sector goods. The
utility function U of a worker in region i is given by a two-tier form. The upper-tier is the following
Cobb–Douglas function:
U(CMi , CAi )  µ lnCMi + (1 − µ) lnCAi (0 < µ < 1), (C.1.1)
whereCAi is the consumption ofA-sector goods in region i, C
M
i the lower-tiermanufacturing aggregate
in region i, and µ the constant expenditure share ofmanufacturedgoods. The lower tier,CMi , is defined
by the following constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregate:
CMi ≡
(∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
q ji(ξ)(σ−1)/σdξ
)σ/(σ−1)
, (C.1.2)
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where n j is the number of varieties produced in region j, q ji(ξ) is the consumption of variety
ξ ∈ [0, n j], and σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. As we take
A-sector goods as the numéraire, the budget constraint of a worker in region i is given by
CAi +
∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.1.3)
where p ji(ξ) denotes the delivered price in region i of the M-sector goods produced in region j and
yi denotes the income of the worker. The incomes (wages) of the skilled and the unskilled workers
are represented by wi and wui , respectively.
Demand. Utility maximization yields the following demand:
CMi  µ
yi
Pi
, CAi  (1 − µ)yi , q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi , (C.1.4)
where Pi denotes the price index of the diﬀerentiated product in region i:
Pi ≡
(∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)1−σdξ
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.1.5)
Since the total income in region i is given by Yi  wihi + wui li , we have the following total demand
Q ji(ξ) for the variety ξ produced in j:
Q ji(ξ) 
µ{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P1−σi
(wihi + wui li). (C.1.6)
The total supply xi(ξ) of the diﬀerentiated variety ξ in region i should meet the total demand from
all regions including transport costs incurred by shipments:
xi(ξ) 
∑
j∈K
τi jQi j(ξ). (C.1.7)
Firm behavior. With free trade in the A-sector, the wage of the unskilledworker wui is equalized. As
A-sector goods is the numéraire, we have wui  1. In the M-sector, to produce xi unit of diﬀerentiated
product a firm requires α + βxi unit of skilled labor. With increasing returns, every firm specializes
to a single variety. The cost function of a firm in region i producing the variety ξ is thus given by
Ci(xi(ξ)) ≡ wi{α + βxi(ξ)}. (C.1.8)
Therefore, a M-sector firm located in region i specialized to the variety ξ faces the following profit:
Πi(ξ) 
∑
j∈K
pi j(ξ)Qi j(ξ) − Ci(xi(ξ)). (C.1.9)
Since we have a continuum of firms, each one is negligible in the sense that its action has no impact
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on the market (i.e., the price indices). It is standard that profit maximization of firms yields
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1wiτi j (C.1.10)
and that pi j(ξ) is independent of ξ. This fact in turn implies that Qi j(ξ) and xi(ξ) also do not depend
on ξ. We thus omit ξ in the following.
Short-run equilibrium. In the short run, the spatial distribution h  (hi)i∈K of skilled workers is
fixed. Given h, we determine the short-run equilibrium wage w ≡ (wi)i∈K by the M-sector product
market clearing condition (PMCC), the zero-profit condition (ZPC), the skilled labor market clearing
condition (LMCC). First, the ZPC for every M-sector firm dictates that xi  α(σ − 1)/β, so that the
required skilled-labor input being ασ. Then, the skilled labor-market clearing yields ασni  hi . We
note that using ni  hi/(ασ), we have
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
h j(w jτ ji)1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.1.11)
with di j ≡ τ1−σi j ; D  [di j]  [τ1−σi j ] is the friction matrix. Employing the formula up to here, the
M-sector PMCC (C.1.7) implies that
wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(w jh j + l j), (C.1.12)
which is the so-called wage equation. Adding up (C.1.12), we obtain∑
i∈K
wihi 
µ
1 − µL (C.1.13)
which constrains w at any configuration h. The existence and uniqueness of solution for the wage
equation under a fixed h and the normalization constraint (C.1.13) follows by a standard nonlinear-
complementarity-problem arguments (Facchinei and Pang, 2007) and thus we shall omit. Given the
solution w(h) of (C.1.12), we have the following indirect utility function of skilled workers:
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi] (C.1.14)
where κ¯ ≡ µ/(σ − 1) and ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K hkw1−σk dki . Note that we omitted the constant terms as they do
not aﬀect properties of equilibrium spatial patterns. We shall follow this convention for the rest of
Appendix C. Long-run equilibria are defined by [VIP] in Appendix B.3 based on the payoﬀ function
(C.1.14).
Jacobianmatrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Assumea racetrack economy (i.e., di j  τ1−σi j  exp[−τℓi j]
with τ > 0; see Section 3.1) with uniform unskilled labor endowment (i.e., li  l ≡ L/K for all i ∈ K ).
Then, it is trivial that the flat-earth pattern is a long-run equilibrium. As we must evaluate ∇v(h¯), we
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shall first derive ∇v(h)  [∂vi(h)/∂h j] at any interior solution h. We have
∂vi(h)
∂h j

κ¯
∆i
(
∂∆i
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
(C.1.15)
 κ¯
(
1
∆i
w1−σj d ji + (1 − σ)
∑
k∈K
1
∆i
hkw−σk dki
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
(C.1.16)
 κ¯
(
1
h j
m ji + (1 − σ)
∑
k∈K
mki
1
wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
(C.1.17)
where mi j ≡ hiw1−σi di j/∆ j , or in the vector–matrix formM  [mi j]  diag[w1−σ ◦h]D(diag[∆])−1 with
∆  [∆i]  D⊤ diag[w]1−σh. We let xa ≡ [xai ] and x ◦ y ≡ [xi yi]. Noting that κ¯(1 − σ)  −µ, we have
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 − µM⊤ diag[w]−1∇w(h) + diag[w]−1∇w(h) (C.1.18)
 κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 + (I − µM⊤) diag[w]−1∇w(h) (C.1.19)
where ∇w(h) ≡ [∂wi(h)/∂h j] is yet to be known. Letting
Wi(h,w) ≡ wihi − µ
∑
k∈K
mik(wkhk + l), (C.1.20)
the wage equation is equivalent toW (h,w)  0. Thanks to the implicit function theorem, it can be
shown that ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )where ∇wW ≡ [∂Wi/∂w j] and ∇W ≡ [∂Wi/∂h j] are given by
∂Wi
∂w j
 δi jhi − µ
∑
k∈K
∂mik
∂w j
(wkhk + l) − µmi jh j (C.1.21)
 δi jhi − µ(1 − σ) 1w j
(
δi j
∑
k∈K
mik(wkhk + l) −
∑
k∈K
mikm jk(wkhk + l)
)
− µmi jh j , (C.1.22)
∂Wi
∂h j
 δi jwi − µ
∑
k∈K
∂mik
∂h j
(wkhk + l) − µmi jw j (C.1.23)
 δi jwi − µ 1h j
(
δi j
∑
k∈K
mik(w jh j + l) −
∑
k∈K
mikm jk(wkhk + l)
)
− µmi jw j , (C.1.24)
with δi j being the Kronecker’s delta. In the vector–matrix form, we have
∇wW  diag[h] − µ(1 − σ)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 − µM diag[h] (C.1.25)
∇W  diag[w] − µ(diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[h]−1 − µM diag[w] (C.1.26)
where Y  [Yi] ≡ [wihi + l] is the vector of the regional total income.
Assume the flat-earth equilibriumwhere h  h1with h ≡ H/K. Then, we know that the (uniform
level of) equilibrium wage is given by w¯ ≡ µ/(1 − µ) · L/H and the (uniform level of) total income of
a region Y¯ ≡ l/(1 − µ)  1/(1 − µ) · L/K, whence we have Y¯/w¯  h/µ and Y¯/h  w¯/µ. We also have
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M  D¯  D/d where d is the row sum ofD. It then follows that
∇w(h¯)  w¯
h
[
σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1D¯ (µI − D¯) (C.1.27)
and thus that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[
I − κD¯ − ρD¯2]−1[(κ + κ¯)D¯ − (µκ¯ + σ−1)D¯2] (C.1.28)
where κ ≡ µ/σ and ρ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1). We recall that circulant matrices commute (Lemma B.1). It
thus follows that for the Kmmodel, we have∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯+c2D¯2with c1  κ+ κ¯ and c2  −(µκ¯+σ−1).
Remark C.1. A comparison with the literature would be useful for providing some insights. Letting
{ek} be the eigenvalues of ∇v(h¯), we have
ek 
1
h
fk
(κ + κ¯) − (µκ¯ + σ−1) fk
1 − κ fk − ρ f 2k

K
H
(
1 − ρ
ρ
)
fk
[
µ(1 + ρ) − (µ2 + ρ) fk
1 − µ(1 − ρ) fk − ρ f 2k
]
. (C.1.29)
But then onewill immediately notice that this expression is a generalized version of the equation (5.27)
of Fujita et al. (1999a) for the Km model in the symmetric two-region setting (with a rearrangement):
1
P−µ0
dω
dλ

2
λ + (1 − λ)
(
1 − ρ
ρ
)
Z
[
µ(1 + ρ) − (µ2 + ρ)Z
1 − µ(1 − ρ)Z − ρZ2
]
(C.1.30)
which expresses the change in the real wage ω ≡ w0P−µ0 at region 0 when its share of skilled worker
λ slightly increased. Here, Z is “an index of trade barriers” defined by the equation (5.25), ibid:
Z ≡ 1 − T
1−σ
1 + T1−σ (C.1.31)
whereT > 1 is the iceberg transport cost parameter between the regions. We thus see that the “real wage
diﬀerential” exercise often conducted in the literature is a special case of our approach. In fact, if we assume
K  2, the only possible deviation direction is η1  (1,−1), which corresponds to agglomeration
toward one of the regions. Given the freeness of transport r between the two regions, its associated
eigenvalue of D¯ is given by
f1 
1 − r
1 + r
, (C.1.32)
which precisely coincides with the above Z—since r  T1−σ for this case. In the two-region economy,
there is only a single possible deviation direction: agglomeration. We thus only have to investigate the
sign of dω/dλ. In a many-region racetrack economy, however, there are multiple possible deviation
directions and thus stability of the flat-earth pattern depends on the signs of all (ek)K−1k1 .
Remark C.2. As emphasized by the literature, the coeﬃcients of G( f ) have clear economic interpre-
tations. The first, c1, represents demand externality through price index (κ¯) and a home-market eﬀect
(κ). For the former, κ¯, observe that 1/(σ − 1) in κ¯ is the markup of firms or the magnitude of product
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diﬀerentiation; an agglomeration, by improving proximity of mobile agents to production location of
firms, increases payoﬀ of agglomerated regions. The latter, κ, is a homemarket eﬀect. Note that 1/σ in
κ is the share of fixed cost (wage of a mobile agent which is required to operate) in a firm’s production
cost. The second, c2, on the other hand, represents the dispersion force. The centrifugal force of the
model is due to increasedmarket competition caused by concentration of firms (the so-called “market
crowding eﬀect”). Since there is spatially dispersed demand (immobile agents), firms in a region
of agglomeration may hope to relocate to other, less crowded regions (σ−1 in c2). In addition, the
price-index eﬀect by reducing firm’s market share and hence wage of mobile agents produces another
global dispersion force (µκ¯ in c2). The eﬀect produces a dispersion force from outside of a region.
Numerical simulation. Figure 8 assumes the Km model. Parameters are set as µ  0.4, σ  10,
L  8, and H  1.
C.2 Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) (FO) model
The FO model is a slightly simplified version of Krugman (1991)’s NEG model. The model is
sometimes called the footloose-entrepreneur model, since a unit of skilled (mobile) labor is required as
the fixed input of a manufacturing firm. The only diﬀerence is that variable input of M-sector firms
in the Km model is now replaced by unskilled labor. Specifically, in order to produce xi(ξ) unit of
product ξ, a M-sector firm now requires α unit of skilled labor and βxi(ξ) unit of unskilled labor.
Therefore, for the FO model, the total cost of production for a firm in region i is
Ci(x(ξ))  αwi + βxi(ξ)wui . (C.2.1)
Wage equalization of the A-sector (wui  1 for all i ∈ K ) then implies that
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1τi j (C.2.2)
provided that A-sector goods are produced at every region (we assume βxini < li for all i ∈ K ).
Again, we drop ξ in what it follows.
Short-run equilibrium. The short-run equilibrium conditions are again the PMCC, the LMCC, and
the ZPC. First, since a firm requires α unit of skilled labor, the LMCC implies that αni  hi , which in
turn yields the price index Pi for the FO model:
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(
1
α
∑
j∈K
h jd ji
)1/(1−σ)
(C.2.3)
where d ji ≡ τ1−σji is the trade friction between the regions i and j. Note that, unlike the Km model,
Pi does not depend on the wage w  (wi)i∈K . The ZPC implies that the operating profit of a firm is
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entirely absorbed by the wage bills:
wi 
(∑
j∈K
pi jQi j − βxi
)
. (C.2.4)
Together with the PMCC, we have the following wage equation for the model:
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j∑
k∈K dk jhk
(w jh j + l j) (C.2.5)
The equation is analytically solvable. Specifically, in the vector–matrix form, we have
w  κ [I − κM diag[h]]−1Ml (C.2.6)
where κ ≡ µ/σ, l ≡ (li), and M ≡ [mi j]  [di j/∆ j]  D{diag[∆]}−1 with ∆i  ∑ j∈K d jih j so that
∆  [∆i]  D⊤h. The indirect utility v(h) of each of the many-region FO model is expressed as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi] (C.2.7)
where κ¯ ≡ µ/(σ − 1). We again ignore the constant terms. Long-run equilibria are defined by (B.3.1)
with respect to the above (C.2.7).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. In a racetrack economy, following completely the same
line of logic as in the Km model, we obtain
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[I − κD¯]−1
[
(κ¯ + κ)D¯ − (κ¯κ + 1)D¯2
]
(C.2.8)
where D¯ ≡ D/d. We thus conclude that ∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c1  κ¯ + κ and c2  −(κ¯κ + 1).
C.3 Pflüger (2004) (Pf) model
The Pf model is a further simplified version of the FO model (and hence the Km model) in which we
assume a quasi-linear utility function for the upper-tier as follows:
U(CMi , CAi )  CAi + µ lnCMi . (C.3.1)
Taking the A-sector goods as numéraire, it is standard that utility maximization yields the following
demand, where the income eﬀect in CMi is lost compared to the Km and FO models:
CAi  yi − µ, CMi  µ
1
Pi
. (C.3.2)
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where the price index Pi is the same as the FO model. Thus, replacing the total income of a region
Yi  wihi+ li in (C.2.5) by the total number of workers hi+ li , we obtain the following “wage equation”
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j∑
k∈K dk jhk
(h j + l j) (C.3.3)
which is, actually, already solved. The indirect utility is given by
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + wi (C.3.4)
where ∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K d jih j . Long-run equilibria are defined by (B.3.1) with respect to the above (C.2.7).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We show
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ + κ (M −M diag[H]M⊤) (C.3.5)
withH  [Hi] ≡ [hi + li] andM  [mi j] ≡ [di j/∆ j] and thus that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
[
(κ¯ + κ)D¯ − κ(1 + ϵ)D¯2
]
(C.3.6)
with ϵ  L/H being the ratio of the number of unskilled worker to that of skilled. We thus see that
∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c1  κ¯ + κ and c2  −κ(1 + ϵ).
C.4 Helpman (1998) (Hm) model
Helpman (1998) removed the A-sector in Krugman (1991) and thereby assumes that all workers are
mobile. Instead of the A-sector, the Hm model introduces the housing (abbreviated as H) sector and
each region i is endowed with a fixed stock Ai of housing.
Preference. The utility function of a worker in region i is given by
U(CMi , CHi )  µ lnCMi + γ lnCHi (C.4.1)
where CHi is the consumption of H-sector goods in region i and γ is the constant expenditure share
on it (γ + µ  1). The budget constraint of a worker located at i is represented by
pHi C
H
i +
∑
j
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.4.2)
where pHi is the price of H-sector goods in region i. Utility maximization leads to the following
demand for the H-sector goods:
CHi  γ
yi
pHi
. (C.4.3)
Housing market clearing. In the H-sector, the total demand hiCHi in region i cannot be greater than
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the maximum supply Ai . If the demand in region i is less than the supply, the price pHi should be the
lower boundary (i.e., zero), otherwise positive. Thus, we have the following housing market clearing
condition: 
hiCHi  Ai if p
H
i > 0,
hiCHi ≤ Ai if pHi  0,
∀i. (C.4.4)
From (C.4.3), pHi , 0 for any long-run equilibrium; because C
A
i →∞ and thusU →∞ as pHi → 0 and
such a spatial pattern is never sustainable. We thus conclude that
CHi 
Ai
hi
, pHi  γ
yihi
Ai
(C.4.5)
and that hi > 0 at any long-run equilibrium.
Landownership. Wehere consider two typesof assumptionson landownership: public landownership
(abbreviated as PL) and local landownership (LL). In the original formulation, the housing stocks are
equally owned by all workers (i.e., PL). In this way, the income of a worker in region i is the sum of
wage and devident of rental revenue, yi  wi + w¯H, where
w¯H 
1
H
∑
i∈K
pHi C
H
i hi 
γ
H
∑
i∈K
yihi (C.4.6)
so that rearrangement yields
w¯H 
γ
(1 − γ)H
∑
i∈K
wihi . (C.4.7)
We shall set w¯H  1 so that we can normalize wi to satisfy
∑
i∈K wihi  (µ/γ)H. On the other hand,
Ottaviano et al. (2002), Murata and Thisse (2005), and Redding and Sturm (2008) assume that the
housing stocks are locally owned (i.e., LL). It is, yi  wi + wHi where w¯i  p
H
i C
H
i  γyi , which in
turn yields that yi  wi/µ. Also for this case, analogous to the public landownership case, we shall
constrain w by the condition
∑
i∈K wihi  (µ/γ)H for normalization.
Short-run equilibrium. Regarding the short-run equilibrium conditions, the only diﬀerence from
the Km model is the total expenditure at each region, which is now
Yi 

(wi + 1)hi , (for PL),
wihi/µ, (for LL).
(C.4.8)
The short-run equilibrium wage equation is thus given by:
[PL] wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
di jw1−σi hi∑
k∈K dk jw1−σk hk
(w j + 1)h j , (C.4.9)
62
[LL] wihi 
∑
j∈K
di jw1−σi hi∑
k∈K dk jw1−σk hk
w jh j . (C.4.10)
Given the solution w for (C.4.9) or (C.4.9), the indirect utility v(h) is expressed as
vi(h) 

κ¯ ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi + 1] − γ ( ln[hi] − ln[Ai]) , (for PL),
κ¯ ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi] − γ ( ln[hi] − ln[Ai]) , (for LL) (C.4.11)
where ∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K h jw1−σj d ji .
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let Ai  A for all regions to abstract from location-fixed
exogenous eﬀects. For the PL case, one can show that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
{
κ¯D¯ + µ(µI − D¯) [σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 D¯(I − D¯) − γI} (C.4.12)

σ
h
[
σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 {−γI + (κ¯ + κ)D¯ + {γ − (µκ¯ + 1
σ
)}
D¯2
}
(C.4.13)
so that ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with c0  −γ, c1  µ
(
1
σ−1 +
1
σ
)
, and c2  γ − 1σ − µ
2
σ−1 . We recall that
γ is the expenditure share on housing good, whence one can understand that the dispersion force
expressed by c0 < 0 solely arises from local housing. For the LL case one can show that
∇v(h¯)  1
h
{
κ¯D¯ + µ(I − D¯) [σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1 D¯ − γI} (C.4.14)

σ
h
[σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1
{
−γI +
(
µ
σ − 1 +
µ
σ
− γσ − 1
σ
)
D¯
}
. (C.4.15)
From this, we conclude that for the LL case ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ with c0  −γ and c1  µσ−1 + µσ − γ σ−1σ .
RemarkC.3. For themodel, the condition for theuniqueness of equilibrium is givenby γσ  (1−µ)σ >
1 (Redding and Sturm, 2008). One can show that if γσ > 1 is satisfied, regardless of the assumption
on landownership, the flat-earth eqilibrium is stable.
Remark C.4. The regional model formulated in §3 of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) is an
enhanced version of the Hmmodel with local landownership, in which variable input of skilled labor
is allowed to depend on region i (i.e., productivity diﬀers across regions). That is, the cost function
of firms in region i becomes
Ci(xi(ξ))  wi(α + βixi(ξ)). (C.4.16)
It then implies that the short-run equilibrium price and price index in region i becomes
pi j(ξ)  σβiσ − 1τi jwi , (C.4.17)
Pi 
σ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
h j(β jw jτ ji)1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (C.4.18)
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respectively. As the model assumes local landownership, the wage equation for the model is
wihi 
∑
j∈K
hiAiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkAkw1−σk dk j
w jh j , (C.4.19)
where we define Ai ≡ β1−σi . Thus, abstracting from first natures by setting Ai  A¯, the model reduces
to the Hm model under LL.
C.5 Puga (1999) (Pg) model
Puga (1999) generalized the Km model in two directions: namely, (i) intersector mobility of workers
between agriculture (A) and manufacture (M) (without immobile workers but land) and (ii) interme-
diate inputs in the M-sector, both as in Krugman and Venables (1995).
Assumptions. There are only a mass H of mobile workers, with hi denoting the number of workers
located in region i. We denote by hMi and h
A
i the number of workers engaged in the M- and A-sectors,
respectively (hi  hMi +h
A
i ). The homogeneous preference of consumers is the same asKmmodel, with
the expenditure share on M-sector good µ and the elasticity of substitution between manufactured
varieties σ. Each region is endowed with Ai unit of land, which is owned by immobile landlords that
have the same preference as the workers. We assume that, if a worker should relocate, then she enters
in the M-sector of the destination region in the first place. The stability of the spatial pattern h is then
reduced to the study of hM ≡ [hMi ].
A-sector. The A-sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous output using labor
and land under constant returns to scale. The A-sector goods are costless to trade and are set to the
numéraire. Let XAi be the gross regional product of the A-sector. In line with the original paper,
we shall specify a Cobb–Douglas production function with labor share µ¯; in concrete terms, we have
XAi  (hAi )µ¯A
1−µ¯
i . It implies that the total cost of A-sector firms on labor is given by µ¯X
A
i  wih
A
i as
well as that on land ( the total rental revenue of landlords) by (1 − µ¯)XAi  1−µ¯µ¯ wihAi . In particular,
the labor demand in this sector is given by a function of the wage hAi  Ai(wi/µ¯)1/(µ¯−1), because
wi  µ¯(hAi /Ai)µ¯−1. Let hAi  ϵihMi , so that hi  (1 + ϵi)hMi ; we here consider the case hMi , 0, because
we are interested in the stability of complete dispersion. We also have ϵi ≡ (Ai/hMi )(wi/µ¯)1/(µ¯−1). The
regional rental revenue from land, Ri in terms of hMi is:
Ri ≡ 1 − µ¯µ¯ ϵiwih
M
i . (C.5.1)
We also note that, employing the above formulae, the elasticity νi of a region’s labor supply to the
M-sector with respect to wage is
νi ≡ wi
hMi
∂hMi
∂wi

hAi
hMi
1
1 − µ¯  ϵi
1
1 − µ¯ . (C.5.2)
It is also noted that if µ¯  0, we have XAi  Ai as well as Ri  Ai and ϵi  0.
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M-sector. Considering the simplest possible model of intermediate inputs as in Krugman and
Venables (1995), the minimum cost function of the M-sector is replaced by
C(xi(ξ))  P µˆi w
1−µˆ
i (α + βxi(ξ)) (C.5.3)
where Pi is the price index of M-sector goods in region i and µˆ the share of intermediates in firms’
costs. The profit-maximizing price is given by
pi j(ξ)  σβσ − 1P
µˆ
i w
1−µˆ
i τi j , (C.5.4)
which, together with the definition of Pi , implies that we should solve a system of nonlinear equations
to obtain Pi . In concrete terms, the price indices {Pi} should satisfy
Pi 
σβ
σ − 1
(∑
j∈K
n j
(
P µˆj w
1−µˆ
j
)1−σ
d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(C.5.5)
where di j ≡ τ1−σi j . We must solve (C.5.5) along with the wage equation to be defined below.
In line of the Kmmodel, the ZPC of firms implies xi(ξ)  α(σ−1)/β. Firms’minimized production
cost in region i is then given by Ci  (ασ)P µˆi w
1−µˆ
i , so that labor demand in the M-sector of region i is
hMi  (1 − µˆ)
Ci
wi
ni  ασ(1 − µˆ)P µˆi w
−µˆ
i ni . (C.5.6)
The mass of varieties produced in region i is thus given as follows:
ni 
1
ασ(1 − µˆ)P
−µˆ
i w
µˆ
i h
M
i . (C.5.7)
For simplicity, in the following, as in the original paperwe shall normalize constants such that α  1/σ
and β  (σ − 1)/σ. Then, plugging (C.5.7) to (C.5.5), we have
P1−σi 
1
1 − µˆ
∑
j∈K
hMj P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j d ji . (C.5.8)
Land is locally owned by immobile landlords that share the same preference as mobile workers; the
regional expenditure on M-sector goods from them is given by µRi . Also, the regional expenditure
of firms on intermediates is given by
µˆCini 
µˆ
1 − µˆwih
M
i . (C.5.9)
The total expenditure in region i onM-sector goods is Yi  µwihi +µRi + µˆCini . Using (C.5.1) as well
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as hi  (1 + ϵi)hMi , it is simplified to
Yi  µ(1 + ϵi)wihMi + µRi +
µˆ
1 − µˆwih
M
i 
[
µ
(
1 +
ϵi
µ¯
)
+
µˆ
1 − µˆ
]
wihMi . (C.5.10)
From the ZPC of firms, the wage equation for the model is given by61
1
1 − µˆwih
M
i︸        ︷︷        ︸
M-sector firms’ total cost

∑
j∈K
hMi P
−µˆσ
i w
1−σ+µˆσ
i di j∑
k∈K hMk P
−µˆσ
k w
1−σ+µˆσ
k dk j
[
µ
(
1 +
ϵ j
µ¯
)
+
µˆ
1 − µˆ
]
w jhMj︸                                                                       ︷︷                                                                       ︸
M-sector firms’ total revenue
. (C.5.11)
The short-run wage w  (wi) and price index P  (Pi) are obtained as the solution for the system of
nonlinear equations (C.5.8) and (C.5.11). It is noted that we must require µˆ < σ−1σ so that P andw are
uniquely determined for any value of transportation cost.
Given P and w, the indirect utility function is
vi(h)  µσ − 1 ln[∆i] + ln[wi] (C.5.12)
with ∆i 
∑
j∈K hMj P
−µˆσ
j w
1−σ+µˆσ
j d ji .
Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let Ai  A for all i and consider the
flat-earth equilibrium. Let h ≡ H/K be the uniform number of mobile agents; let also hM and hA be
the number of mobile agents engaged in the M- and A-sector, respectively. Also, let Y¯, P¯, w¯, Ω¯ and ϵ¯
be the uniform level of regional expenditure, the price index, the wage, Ωi , and the ratio ϵi of hAi to
hMi , at the flat-earth equilibrium, respectively. Adding up the wage equations (C.5.11) at the flat-earth
equilibrium, we show
ϵ¯ 
hA
hM
 µ¯
1 − µ
µ
. (C.5.13)
A larger µ¯ (µ) implies a larger (smaller) ϵ¯  hA/hM, which is intuitive. The explicit formula of ϵ¯ yields
Y¯ 
w¯
1 − µˆ
ϵ¯
1 + ϵ¯
h , w¯  µ¯
(
h
A
ϵ¯
1 + ϵ¯
) µ¯−1
. (C.5.14)
Observe that, together with the fact ϵ¯/µ¯  µ1−µ , µ¯ does not aﬀect stability of h¯ but scales the total
amount of the world income. We also have P¯  ρw¯ where ρ ≡ {(hMd)(1 − µˆ)}1/(1−σ+µˆσ) with d being
the row-sum ofD and that ∆i  ∆¯ ≡ (1 − µˆ)P¯1−σ. Note that at the equilibrium, we have
1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂hMi
 − 1
µ¯
ϵ¯
hM
 − 1
hM
1 − µ
µ
(C.5.15)
61The original analyses in Puga (1999) allow possibilities of positive profit of firms. In this appendix, we
shall adhere to zero-profit so that comparisons with the other models become possible.
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Also, with ν¯ ≡ µ¯1−µ¯ 1−µµ being the elasticity of labor supply from A- to the M-sector with respect to wi ,
∂hMi
∂wi
 ν¯
hM
wi
,
1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂wi

1
µ¯
∂ϵi
∂hM
∂hMi
∂wi
 −ν¯ 1
wi
1 − µ
µ
(C.5.16)
Also, we assume that ∂hi/∂hMi  ∂hMi /∂hi  1 as discussed. It follows that, at h¯,
∂Yi
∂hMi

(
µˆ
1 − µˆ + µ
)
w¯ ,
∂Yi
∂wi

(
1
1 − µˆ + (1 − µ)ν¯
)
hM. (C.5.17)
The Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function is computed as
∂vi
∂h j

µ
σ − 1
1
∆i
(
∂∆i
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂Pk
∂Pk
∂h j
+
∑
k∈K
∂∆i
∂wk
∂wk
∂h j
)
+ δi , j
1
wi
∂wi
∂h j
, (C.5.18)
where δi , j is Kronecker’s delta; below, we shall evaluate ∇∆ ≡ [∂∆i/∂h j], ∇P∆ ≡ [∂∆i/∂P j], ∇w∆ ≡
[∂∆i/∂w j], ∇P ≡ [∂Pi/∂h j], and ∇w ≡ [∂wi/∂h j].
For ∇∆, ∇P∆, and ∇w∆, we compute as follows: ∇∆  ∆¯(hM)−1D¯, ∇w∆  ∆¯w¯−1aD¯, as well as
∇P∆  ∆¯P¯−1bD¯, with a ≡ 1 − σ + µˆσ and b ≡ −µˆσ. Thus, at the flat-earth pattern, ∇v(h¯) is
∇v(h¯)  µ
σ − 1
(
1
hM
D¯ +
1
P¯
bD¯∇P
)
+
1
w¯
(
I +
µa
σ − 1D¯
)
∇w (C.5.19)
The remaining task is to evaluate ∇P and ∇w. First, totally diﬀerentiating the definition of price
index (C.5.8), we have ∇QdhM + ∇wQdw + ∇PQdP  0with
∇PQ ≡ [(σ − 1)I + bD¯] , ∇hQ ≡ P¯hM D¯, ∇wQ ≡ a
P¯
w¯
D¯. (C.5.20)
Also, total diﬀerentiation of the wage equation implies ∇WdhM + ∇wWdw + ∇PWdP  0with
∇wW ≡ hMI − (1 − µˆ)
[
a
1
w¯
Y¯(I − D¯2) + ∂Y¯
∂w
D¯
]
, (C.5.21)
∇hW ≡ w¯I − (1 − µˆ)
[
1
hM
Y¯(I − D¯2) + ∂Y¯
∂hM
D¯
]
, (C.5.22)
∇PW ≡ −(1 − µˆ)b 1P¯ Y¯(I − D¯
2)∇P . (C.5.23)
We already computed Y¯, ∂Y¯/∂w, and ∂Y¯/∂hM. These relations yields the analytical expressions for
the Jacobian matrices ∇P and ∇w:
∇P  −[∇wQ∇PW − ∇PQ∇wW ]−1[∇wQ∇hW − ∇hQ∇wW ], (C.5.24)
∇w  [∇wQ∇PW − ∇PQ∇wW ]−1[∇PQ∇hW − ∇hQ∇PW ]. (C.5.25)
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Summing up the computations up to here, a patient computation yields
∇v(h¯)  J−10
[
µˇ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ −
(
µˇ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
+ ω
)
D¯2
]
(C.5.26)
where J0 is a positive definitematrix defined by D¯, µˇ ≡ µˆ+µ(1− µˆ)which is loosely interpreted as the
aggregate expenditure share on M-sector goods, and ω ≡ µ(1−µˇ)σ(σ−1) (1 − ν¯) is a constant that summarizes
the eﬀects of labor mobility between A- and M-sectors at h¯. Thus, ∇v(h¯) ≃ c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with
c1  µˇ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
> 0, (C.5.27)
c2  −
(
µˇ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
+ ω
)
< 0. (C.5.28)
C.6 Tabuchi (1998) (Tb) model
The Tbmodel introduces internal structure of regions to the Kmmodel. Themain thrust of the model
is, unlike majority of regional models, the city boundary in each region is endogenously determined
by a full-fledged monocentric city model of Alonso–Muth–Mills. This produces a rich structure of
urban costs, because the trade-oﬀ between commuting cost and land rent is made explicit.
In this model, there are all of the three sectors of M, H, A in the Km and Hm models. Internal
structure of each region is featureless, except that it is endowed with a single central business district
(CBD) with negligible spatial extent. In each region, locations are indexed by the distance from the
CBD, x ≥ 0. At any point, the land endowment density is assumed to be unity. The total numbers
of skilled and unskilled workers are given by H and L, respectively. The number of skilled workers
in region i is denoted by hi , whereas the spatial distribution (density) in that region is, allowing a
notational abuse, denoted by hi(x). Thus, we have∫ x¯i
0
hi(x)dx  hi (C.6.1)
where x¯i ≥ 0 is the city boundary in region i that is endogenously determined. Unskilled workers
are employed by the A-sector and do not commute to the CBD, whereas those skilled do. A skilled
worker at distance x from the CBD incur generalized cost of commuting T(x) which is measured by
the numéraire.
Preference. The utility of a representative worker living in region i and located at x is given by
U(CMi , CHi , CAi )  µ lnCMi + γ lnCHi + (1 − µ − γ) lnCAi (C.6.2)
where µ and γ with µ + γ < 1 are the constant expenditure shares for manufactured goods and
housing goods, respectively; CMi is the CES aggregate of the M-sector goods defined by (C.1.2), C
H
i
the consumption of housing space (the H-sector goods), CAi the consumption of agricultural products
(the A-sector goods) in region i. The M-sector goods are subject to iceberg transport cost, whereas
those of the A-sector not for both intra- and interregional transportation. TheH-sector goods are local
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and nontradable. Choosing the A-sector goods as the numéraire, the budget constraint of a skilled
worker at location x in region i is
CAi + ri(x)CHi (x) +
∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ + Ti(x)  yi , (C.6.3)
where ri(x) is the land rent prevailing at location x in the region i, T(x) the generalized cost of
commuting from location x to the CBD, and yi the income of the worker. We assume that T(x) is
diﬀerentiable and increasing in x with T(0)  0. Note that T(x) is independent of its population
and is homogeneous among the regions. Given price including land rent profile {ri(x)}, utility
maximization yields
CMi (x)  µ
yi(x)
Pi
, CHi (x)  γ
yi(x)
ri(x) , C
A
i (x)  (1 − µ − γ)yi(x), q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi (C.6.4)
where yi(x)  yi −T(x) is the net income of a worker residing at x in region i. Following the tradition
of urban economics, themodel assumes absentee landowners who keep the rental revenue of housing
so that we have yi  wi for every skilled worker. Unskilled workers live outside the city and does not
commute to the CBD. Thus, they face the agricultural land rent rA > 0 and zero commuting cost, as
well as yi  1. For simplicity, we assume that rA is the same across the regions. We also assume that
intracity transportation of M-sector products is costless, so that both unskilled and skilled workers
face the same M-sector product price.
Internal structure of each region. As discussed, the diﬀerence compared to the Km model is that
the internal structure of each region is now explicitly modeled by a monocentric city model. The
standard first-order condition for equilibrium spatial pattern is that
CHi (x)
dri(x)
dx
+
dT(x)
dx
 0 (C.6.5)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯ with the boundary condition being ri(x¯)  rA. In the following, we focus on a single
region given fixed values of wi and hi . For simplicity, we omit index i unless otherwise noted.
Combining CHi (x) in (C.6.4), we obtain the land rent profile r(x) given w:
r(x)  rˆ{1 − T(x)/w}1/γ (C.6.6)
with r(x¯)  rA at the city boundary x¯ of the region. Thus, rˆ, the land rent at the CBD (x  0) when
the city boundary is at x¯ and wage rate is w, is determined as
rˆ(x¯ , w)  r
A
{1 − T(x¯)/w}1/γ . (C.6.7)
We observe that rˆ  rA when hi  0 because x¯  0 and T(0)  0. With a notational abuse, the
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population density function h(x) in the region for given x¯ and w becomes
h(x)  a(x)
CH(x) 
a(x)r(x)
γy(x) 
rˆ(x¯ , w)
γw
a(x){1 − T(x)/w}1/γ−1 (C.6.8)
where a(x) is land endowment at distance x. We here note that as r(x¯)  rA,
h(x¯)  a(x¯)r
A
γ(w − T(x¯)) . (C.6.9)
In Tabuchi (1998), it is assumed that a(x)  2pix so that the city is disk-shaped.
Comparative statistics for the internal structure of a region. Before studying stability of the flat-earth
equilibrium in the regional scale, we shall first investigate how changes in hi and wi aﬀect the internal
structure of a single region. We note that the population density function h(x) satisfies
∂h(x)
∂x¯

T′(x¯)
γ(w − T(x¯))h(x) > 0 (C.6.10)
∂h(x)
∂w

(
1 − γ
γ(w − T(x)) −
1
γ(w − T(x¯))
)
h(x) < 0 (C.6.11)
provided that w − T(x¯) > 0, which must be the case because otherwise the utility of an agent at x¯
becomes negative infinity. The latter inequality says that, as it is standard in the literature, population
density decreases as the income increases. Define a function H(x¯ , w) that returns the population in
the interval [0, x¯) by
H(x¯ , w) 
∫ x¯
0
h(x)dx. (C.6.12)
Then, the location of the city boundary x¯ for given h and w is determined by the equation
h  H(x¯ , w), (C.6.13)
whence x¯ becomes a function of h and w. For later use, we shall investigate the eﬀects of h and w on
x¯. Applying the implicit function theorem to the equation H(x¯ , w) − h  0, we have
∂x¯
∂h

1
h(x¯) and
∂x¯
∂w
 − 1
h(x¯)
∂H
∂w
, (C.6.14)
where we assume that w is determined in the region-scale trade balance so that w and h are the
independent variables. Note that ∂H/∂x¯  h(x¯). From (C.6.11), we have
∂H
∂w

∫ x¯
0
∂h(x)
∂w
dx < 0 (C.6.15)
which says that the population in the interval [0, x¯) decreases when the income increases. Then, from
(C.6.14) we conclude that (i) the city boundary x¯ is increasing in wi , (ii) x¯ is increasing in hi . Thus,
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we see that x¯ is increasing in both hi and wi , which is standard. Also, define the total (generalized)
costs incurred by commuting in the region by
Ti 
∫ x¯
0
T(x)h(x)dx. (C.6.16)
Then, one can show that
∂Ti
∂h
 T(x¯) + υ
h(x¯)Ti > 0,
∂Ti
∂w
 −∂Ti
∂h
∂H
∂w
> 0 (C.6.17)
where υ is the elasticity of land rent at the city boundary x¯:
υ ≡ − r
′(x¯)
r(x¯) 
T′(x¯)
γ(w − T(x¯)) . (C.6.18)
Thus, the total commuting cost increases in both hi and wi ceteris paribus, which is also standard.
Short-run equilibrium. Consider the regional scale and recover region indices. Given x¯i , the total
expenditure in region i net of commuting cost is given by Yi  wihi − Ti + li . The wage equation for
the model is given by
wihi  µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(w jh j − T j + l j). (C.6.19)
We impose the following constraint on w for normalization∑
i∈K
(wihi − Ti)  µ
1 − µL, (C.6.20)
where we note that Ti depends on both hi and wi . Given the short-run wage, the indirect utility for
region i is obtained by evaluating it at the CBD (x  0) since utility is equalized in each region:
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[yi(x¯i)] (C.6.21)
where ∆i 
∑
j∈K h jw1−σj d ji and yi(x¯i)  wi − T(x¯i).
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We compute as follows:
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[h]−1 − µM⊤∇w(h) diag[w]−1 + diag[yi(x¯i)]−1∇[yi(x¯i)] (C.6.22)
withM defined in line with the Kmmodel and ∇[yi(x¯i)]  ∇w(h)−∇ diag[T(x¯i)], where we note that
∇ diag[T(x¯i)]  diag[T′(x¯i)]∇[x¯i(hi , wi)]  diag[T′(x¯i)]
{
diag[∂x¯i/∂hi] + diag[∂x¯i/∂wi]∇w(h)
}
.
Thus, lettingΨ0 ≡ diag[T′(x¯i)∂x¯i/∂hi] andΨ1 ≡ diag[T′(x¯i)∂x¯i/∂wi], we have
∇[yi(x¯i)]  ∇w(h) − (Ψ0 +Ψ1∇w(h))  −Ψ0 + (I −Ψ1)∇w(h) (C.6.23)
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As in the Km model, ∇w  [∂/∂wi]. For ∇w(h), we have ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇wW  diag[h] + µ(σ − 1)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 − µM∇wY , (C.6.24)
∇W  diag[w] − µ(diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[h]−1 − µM∇Y (C.6.25)
where Y  [Yi]  [wihi − Ti + li], ∇wY  diag[h] − ∇wT , and ∇Y  diag[w] − ∇T .
Consider the flat-earth equilibrium in a symmetric racetrack economy with li  l. Let w¯ and T¯ be
the uniform level of nominal wage rate and the total commuting cost in each region. Note that T¯ is a
function of w¯ and x¯. Given the commuting cost function T(x) and the location of city boundary and
the wage (x¯ , w¯), at the flat-earth equilibrium we shall require
w¯h − T¯(x¯ , w¯)  µ
1 − µ l (C.6.26)
so that wage is normalized. Then, one can show that there exists a unique positive solution (x¯∗ , w¯∗)
such that w¯∗ − T(x¯∗) > 0 for the system of nonlinear equations defined by (C.6.13) and (C.6.26) for
given h. Employing the solution (x¯∗ , w¯∗), the total income in Y is given by Y¯  l/(1 − µ). Define
the ratios φ of the regional total of disposable wage of skilled worker, and φˆ of the regional total
expenditure to the total nominal wage:
φ ≡ w¯h − T¯
w¯h
, φˆ ≡ Y¯
w¯h
. (C.6.27)
The latter implies that Y¯/w¯  φˆh and Y¯/h  φˆw¯. Given (x¯∗ , w∗), we define T(x)-dependent positive
constants ψ0, ψ1, ρ0, and ρ1 such that Ψ0  ψ0I, Ψ1  ψ1I, ∇Y  ρ0w¯I, and ∇wY  ρ1hI. Then,
we can calculate the Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function at the flat-earth equilibrium as follows:
∇v(h¯)  h−1κ¯D¯ − w¯−1µD¯∇w(h¯) − y¯−1ψ0I + y¯−1(1 − ψ1)∇w(h¯), (C.6.28)
 h−1κ¯D¯ − y¯−1ψ0I + { y¯−1(1 − ψ1)I − w¯−1µD¯}∇w(h¯) (C.6.29)
where y¯ ≡ y(x¯∗)  w¯∗ − T(x¯∗) is the net wage at x¯∗ and ∇w(h¯)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇W  −w¯ [ − (1 − φˆµ)I + ρ0µD¯ − φˆµD¯2] , , (C.6.30)
∇wW  h
[{
φˆµ(σ − 1) + 1}I − ρ1µD¯ − φˆµ(σ − 1)D¯2] . (C.6.31)
Illustration. Following Tabuchi (1998), we shall investigate the simplest case where the commuting
cost function is linear with respect to distance: T(x)  tx. We shall also simplify the analysis by
assuming the internal structure of each region is one-dimensional and extends symmetrically about
the CBD over the interval [−x¯ , x¯] á la Murata and Thisse (2005). Although this change strengthens
the role of urban costs in each region, it does not aﬀect intrinsic properties of the model. For this case,
letting a(x)  1, we obtain
x¯ 
1
t
(1 − ϵγ)w¯. (C.6.32)
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where the non-dimensional constant ϵ ∈ (0, 1) is defined by ϵ ≡ (1+ tˆh)−1. The parameter tˆ ≡ (t/2)/rA
is interpreted as a measure of relative magnitude of commuting cost to land rent. As expected, x¯ is
decreasing in the generalized commuting cost per distance t. Then, solving (C.6.26) implies that
w¯ 
1
φ
· µ
1 − µ ·
L
H
and φ  1
1 + γ
· 1 − ϵ
1+γ
1 − ϵ (C.6.33)
as well as y¯  ϵγw¯, Y¯  l/(1 − µ), and φˆ  φ/µ. Then, we also have
ψ0  T′(x¯)∂x¯∂h  h
−1 y¯γ(1 − ϵ), ψ1  T′(x¯) ∂x¯∂w  1 − ϵ
γ , (C.6.34)
ρ0 
1
w¯
∂Yi
∂hi

1
w¯
(
wi − ∂Ti∂hi
)
 1 − γ(1 − ϵ)φ, ρ1  1h
∂Yi
∂wi

1
h
(
hi − ∂Ti∂wi
)
 φ. (C.6.35)
Summarizing computations up to here yields analytical expression of ∇v(h¯) as follows
∇v(h¯)  h−1κ¯D¯ + (I − µD¯)w¯−1∇w(h¯) − h−1γˆI , (C.6.36)
∇w(h¯)  w¯h−1 [cˆ0I + cˆ1D¯ + cˆ2D¯2]−1 [c¯0I + c¯1D¯ + c¯2D¯2] (C.6.37)
with the coeﬃcients being

cˆ0 ≡ 1 + (σ − 1)φ > 0,
cˆ1 ≡ −µφ < 0,
cˆ2 ≡ −(σ − 1)φ < 0,

c¯0 ≡ −(1 − φ) < 0,
c¯1 ≡ µ(1 − γˆφ) > 0,
c¯2 ≡ −φ < 0
(C.6.38)
where γˆ ≡ γ(1 − ϵ). Note that φ and γˆ toghether summarize the net eﬀects of the two types of urban
costs; φ and γˆ would represent those from commuting and nontradable land, respectively. As a
consequence, we have ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ + c2D¯2 with
c0  −γˆ
(
1
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
φ
)
< 0, (C.6.39)
c1  µ
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
> 0, (C.6.40)
c2  −
[
µ2
σ − 1
(
φ
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
(1 − γˆφ)
)
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
:ω0
+
1
σ
φ − γˆφ σ − 1
σ︸             ︷︷             ︸
:ω1/σ
]
≡ −
(
µ2
σ − 1ω0 +
1
σ
ω1
)
(C.6.41)
Remark C.5. Observe that if tˆ and γ are both infinitesimally small so that there are virtually no urban
costs, we have γˆ  γ(1 − ϵ) ≈ 0(1 − 1)  0 and φ ≈ (1 + γ)−1 ≈ 1. Then, the coeﬃcients c0, c1, and c2
reduces to those of the Km model, which is intuitive. We note that for general cases, the sign of c2 is
ambiguous. In particular, if γ is large relative to µ and in addition 1− ϵ is small (tˆ or h is small), c2 can
be positive. It is because while housing is important relative to manufactured goods, commuting cost
is quite low; this implies that a concentration of skilled workers is beneficial despite higher market
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competition on the side of firms.
C.7 Pflüger and Südekum (2008) (PS) model
The PS model builds on Pflüger (2004), with only diﬀerence being that it introduces housing sector
(denoted by H) which prodece a local dispersion force.
Preference. The homogeneous preference of skilled workers is given by the following quasilinear
form with respect to the A-sector good (numéraire):
U(CMi , CHi , CAi )  µ lnCAi + γ lnCHi + CAi (C.7.1)
where CMi , C
H
i , and C
A
i are again consumption of manufacturing aggregate, C
H
i the consumption of
housing good, and CAi the agricultural good, respectively. Then, indirect utility of a skilled worker in
region i is obtained as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] − γ(ln[hi + li] − lnAi) + wi (C.7.2)
where ∆i 
∑
j∈K d jih j and li and Ai denote the number of unskilled worker and the amount of
housing stock in region i, respectively, and the nominal wage in region i is given by
wi 
µ
σ
∑
j∈K
di j
∆ j
(h j + l j) (C.7.3)
as in the Pf model.
Jacobian matrix. At the flat-earth equilibrium with li  l and Ai  A for all i, we can show
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [−γ(1 + ϵ)−1I + (κ¯ + κ)D¯ − κ(1 + ϵ)D¯2] (C.7.4)
where ϵ ≡ L/H being the ratio of the total number unskilled worker to that of skilled. We thus
conclude that c0  −γ(1 + ϵ)−1 < 0, c1  κ¯ + κ > 0, and c2  −κ(1 + ϵ) < 0.
Numerical simulation. Figure 11 and Figure 12 assumes Pflüger and Südekum (2008)’s model. The
parameters are set to µ  0.4, σ  2.5, L  4, H  1, γ  0.5, and A  1.
C.8 Murata and Thisse (2005) (MT) model
Similar to the Tb model, Murata and Thisse (2005) studies the interplay between commuting costs
and interregional transport costs employing a simplified yet reasonable specification. The internal
structure of each region is assumed to be one-dimensional and featureless except that there is a given
CBD; the city expands symmetrically about the origin. There are only skilled and mobile workers
that choose their own residential region i and location x ≥ 0 in that region, where the CBD is located
at x  0. The total number of skilled workers is fixed and assumed to be H.
The internal structure of a region. Land endowment equals unity at everywhere in a region and
74
the workers are assumed to inelastically consume one unit of land. The opportunity cost of land
is normalized to zero in every region. Then, the city is spread in the interval Xi ≡ [−x¯i , x¯i] where
x¯i ≡ hi/2 denotes the city boundary. Commuting cost takes an iceberg form. Specifically, a worker
located at x supplies
s(x)  1 − 4θ |x | x ∈ Xi (C.8.1)
unit of labor where we require θ ∈ [0, 1/(2H)) so that we have s(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and for all region
i at any configuration. Then, the total eﬀective labor supply at the CBD of region i is given by
Si 
∫
Xi
s(x)dx  hi(1 − θhi). (C.8.2)
Note that in particular Si  hi when commuting is costless: θ  0. Letting ri(x) the land rent profile,
at an equilibrium it must satisfy
s(x)wi − ri(x)  w¯i , ∀x ∈ Xi , (C.8.3)
where w¯i ≡ s(x¯i)wi − ri(x¯i)  s(x¯i)wi  s(−x¯i)wi  (1 − 2θhi)wi is the disposable wage level of an
worker located at the boundary of the city. We thus have
ri(x)  2θ(hi − 2|x |)wi , ∀x ∈ Xi (C.8.4)
so that the aggregate land rent in region i is
Ri ≡
∫
Xi
ri(x)dx  θwih2i . (C.8.5)
Land is locally owned, so that the income of a worker in region i and any location x is
yi  s(x)wi − ri(x) + Rihi  w¯i + θwihi  (1 − θhi)wi . (C.8.6)
Preference. The homogeneous preference of skilled workers in region i is given by
U(CMi )  lnCMi (C.8.7)
where, as usual, CMi is the consumption of theCES aggregate defined by (C.1.2). The budget constraint
of a mobile worker becomes ∑
j∈K
∫ n j
0
p ji(ξ)q ji(ξ)dξ  yi , (C.8.8)
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where yi denotes income of the worker. It is immediate that given yi , utility maximization yields
CMi 
yi
Pi
, q ji(ξ) 
{p ji(ξ)}−σ
P−σi
CMi (C.8.9)
where Pi is the price index in region i.
Firms. Manufacturing firms are assumed to the same as in the Kmmodel. Specifically, to produce
xi units of good a firm requires α + βxi unit of skilled labor. Thus, the cost function that a firm in
region i faces is given by Ci(xi)  wi(α + βxi). Profit maximization yields pi j(ξ) as in the Km model
(C.1.10), which of course does not depend on ξ. Noting that the number of firms ni in region i is
given by ni  Si/x∗i  (ασ)−1Si , the price index in region i is given as
Pi 
ασ
σ − 1
(
1
ασ
∑
j∈K
S jw1−σj d ji
)1/(1−σ)
(C.8.10)
with di j  τ1−σi j and Si  (1 − θhi)hi .
Short-run equilibrium. Noting that the aggregate income in region i is given by Yi  wiSi , the wage
equation for the MT model becomes
wiSi 
∑
j∈K
Siw1−σi di j∑
k∈K Skw1−σk dk j
w jS j . (C.8.11)
To normalize w we shall assume that
∑
i∈K wiSi  W > 0. Given the solution w to the equation, the
indirect utility of workers in region i is obtained as
vi(h)  κ¯ ln[∆i] + ln[wi] + ln[1 − θhi] (C.8.12)
where κ¯  1/(σ − 1) and ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K hi(1 − θhi)w1−σk dki .
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. We compute as follows:
∇v(h)  κ¯M⊤ diag[S]−1 diag[1 − 2θhi] + (I −M ) diag[w]−1∇w(h) − θ diag[1 − θhi]−1 (C.8.13)
where ∇w(h)  −(∇wW )−1(∇W )with
∇wW  diag[S] + (σ − 1)(diag[MY ] −M diag[Y ]M⊤) diag[w]−1 −M diag[S] (C.8.14)
∇W  [diag[w] − (diag[MY ] −MYM⊤) diag[S]−1 −M diag[w]] diag[1 − 2θhi] (C.8.15)
with Y  [Yi]  [wi(1−θhi)hi] andS  [Si]  [(1−θhi)hi]. Note that Yi  wiSi . Assume a symmetric
racetrack economy. We have
∇wW  (1 − θh)h
[
σI + (σ − 1)D¯] [I − D¯] , (C.8.16)
∇W  −w¯(1 − 2θh)D¯ [I − D¯] , (C.8.17)
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which in turn yield
∇v(h)  1 − 2θh(1 − θh)h
( [
σI + (σ − 1)D¯]−1
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
D¯ − θh
1 − 2θh I
)
(C.8.18)
As a consequence, we obtain ∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯ where, with θˆ ≡ (θh)/(1 − 2θh),
c0  −θˆ, c1  (1 − θˆ)
(
1
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
− θˆ σ − 1
σ
. (C.8.19)
RemarkC.6. Wemust require that 0 ≤ θˆ < 1/{2(K−1)} < 1 to ensure that Si is positive for all region i.
In particular, when H  1 and K  2 so that h  1/2 as in the original paper, we have θˆ  θ/{2(1− θ)}
and θˆ ∈ (0, 1/2). Also, by letting γ ≡ θˆ and µ ≡ 1 − θˆ, the model is isomorphic to Helpman (1998)
model with local landownership, albeit there is a restriction on γ.
C.9 Harris and Wilson (1978) (HW) model
TheHWmodel is an archetypal economic geographymodel formulated in the field of geographywell
before mainstream economists Krugman start to emphasize self-organization of spatial allocation of
ecnomic activity. The model has fruitful applications in urban planning. Detailed analysis of the
model can be found inOsawa et al. (2017). Themodel can be also interpreted to be a spatial conpetition
model with discrete locations but continuum of firms.
Assumptions. We consider a city that is discretized into K zones and associated centroids. There
is a continuum of retailing firms in each zone that operates a shop. The number of firms at zone i is
denoted by hi ≥ 0; h denotes the spatial distribution of retailers. There is a fixed portion of consumers
residing at each zone. Consumers are assumed to inelastically buy retail goods from some shop
located in the city. The total per capita consumer demand for shopping activity at zone i is a constant
Oi . The consumers’ shopping behavior is captured by a set of origin-constrained gravity equations.
For any given h, consumer demand Si j(h) from zone i to j, measured as a cash flow, is given by
Si j(h) 
hαj exp[−βti j]∑
k∈K hαk exp[−βtik]
Oi (C.9.1)
where ti j is the travel cost from zone i to j. The parameters α, β > 0 are exogenous constants. The
term hαi is the attractiveness of the retailers in the zone i where α determines the economy of scale.
We assume α > 1 and hence there is an increasing return to scale. β dictates how fast the demand
decreases with travel cost ti j (respecting the original formulation, this section uses β instead of τ).
Note that one may recast the demand function into the context of spatial competition by interpreting
α−1 as the magnitude of product diﬀerentiation.
Payoﬀ. The payoﬀ (profit) of a retailer at zone i is defined as follows:
Πi(h) 
∑
j∈K S ji(h)
hi
− κi , (C.9.2)
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where κi is the fixed cost of entry. Assume that Oi  1 and that κi  κ for all i. Then, we have
Π(h) M⊤ − κ1 (C.9.3)
whereM ≡ diag[D diag[h]α1]−1D diag[h]α−1 with di j ≡ exp[−βti j].
Long-run equilibrium. The HW model is an open-city model. The total number of retailers at an
equilibrium is thus determined from the following equilibrium condition itself: hiΠi(h)  0, hi ≥
0, Πi(h) ≤ 0. However, at any equilibrium we have ∑i∈K κihi  ∑i∈K Oi ; the set D ≡ {h ∈ RK |∑
i∈K κihi 
∑
i∈K Oi , hi ≥ 0} is globally attracting.
Dynamics. Harris and Wilson (1978) assumes that the spatial pattern h gradually evolves in
proportion to the profit Π(h) and the state h. Specifically, we define Ûh  F (h) ≡ diag[h] · Π(h) 
[Si(h) − κihi]
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. It is immediate that J  ∇F (h¯) is given by
J  κ
{(α − 1)I − αD¯2} (C.9.4)
where I is the identity matrix and D¯ ≡ D/d with d ≡ ∑ j∈K d0, j . We see that J ≃ c0I + c2D¯2 with
c0  1 − 1α , c2  −1. (C.9.5)
It is clear that c0 reflects magnitude of local increasing return. c0 is positive as long as α > 1; α < 1
yields that the flat-earth equilibrium is always stable. c2  −1 represents, analogous to the FOmodel,
firms’ competition over demand from immobile consumers.
C.10 Beckmann (1976) (Bm) model
We formulate a discrete-space version of Beckmann (1976)’s spatial model of social interactions. Since
the original formulation of Beckmann (1976) uses linear communication cost, we shall introduce
suitable modifications. Yet, as long as every consumer communicate with every other consumers,
our modification does not alter the intrinsic properties of agglomeration and dispersion. In particuar,
whether possible equilibria are of unimodal or multimodal does not change. We shall also avoid
unnecessary complication and stick to the simplest possible specification.
Assumptions. Consider a city that is discretized into K areas. Each area i is endowed with fixed
amount Ai of housing stock. Housing stocks are owned by absentee landlords. The city is endowed
with H homogeneous consumers that can choose his/hers residential location and consumes land
and composite good. The income of consumers is a fixed constant Y, which is suﬃciently large.
Preference. In addition to land and composite good, every consumer draws a social utility due to
communication with others. Specifically, everyone at area i draws the following social utility
Si(h)  log[∆i], (C.10.1)
where ∆i ≡ ∑ j∈K di jh j with di j ≡ exp[−τℓi j]. Note that ∆i is exponential accessibility function à la
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Fujita and Ogawa (1982). Given the spatial distribution of consumers h, the utility of residing area i
takes the following quasilinear form
Ui(zi , si ;h)  zi + γ log[si] + Si(h) (C.10.2)
where zi and si is the consumption of the composite and housing goods, respectively, and γ is an
exogenous constant. We set the composite good to the numéraire and the budget constraint of a
worker in area i is
Y  zi + risi , (C.10.3)
whence utility maximization yields si  Ai/hi , ri  αhi/Ai , and zi  Y − γ. Then, assuming Ai  1
at every area and removing constants, the indirect utility at area i is given by
vi(h)  log[∆i] − γ log[hi]. (C.10.4)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Assuming a racetrack economy, it is immediate that the
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium is given by
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [ − γI + D¯] . (C.10.5)
We thus see that c0  −γ and c1  1 for the model. Without any location-fixed factors, Mossay and
Picard (2011) and Blanchet et al. (2016) are essentially the same model as the one presented here.
C.11 Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) (TA) model
Takayama and Akamatsu (2011) is a reduced-form partial equilibriummodel that introduce a spatial
competition eﬀect à la Harris and Wilson (1978) into the Bm model. Specifically, in essence, they
introduced firms that sell goods at a fixed price to spatially immobile consumers. The consumers in
the Bm model are now workers; each worker inelastically provides a single unit of labor.
Immobile consumers. In each area, there are li immobile consumers with
∑
i li  L that demand a
single unit of goods produced by firms; the immobile consumers are assumed to engage in jobs in
other industries. Given spatial distribution n  (ni)i∈K of firms, the demand from area j to i is given
by the following origin-constrained gravity equation
q ji 
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jknk
l j (C.11.1)
with dˆi j ≡ exp[−τˆℓi j], whose microfoundation can be found at, of course, a CES preference or
alternatively some taste heterogeneity.
Firms. A manufacturing firm produces a single unit of manufactured good with fixed price µ
using a single unit of labor of mobile consumers. Thus, we must have ni  hi . The profit function of
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firm at i is given by
Πi(h)  µ
∑
j∈K
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jkhk
l j − wi . (C.11.2)
For simplicity, we force zero profit for firms and abstract from commuting between diﬀerent areas.
Then, wage of a mobile worker at area i equals
wi(h)  µ
∑
j∈K
dˆ ji∑
k∈K dˆ jkhk
l j (C.11.3)
so that the indirect utility of the worker becomes
vi(h)  wi(h) + log[∆i] − γ log[hi]. (C.11.4)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. Let li  L/K for all i and assume that di j  dˆi j for all i
and j (i.e., τ  τˆ). Then, we compute as follows:
∇v(h¯)  h−1 [ − γI + D¯ − µϵD¯2] (C.11.5)
where ϵ ≡ L/H, whence we see that c0  −γ, c1  1, and c2  −µϵ.
C.12 Allen and Arkolakis (2014) (AA) model
The AA model is formulated as a perfectly competitive Armington (1969)-based framework with
positive (production) and negative (congestion) reduced-form local agglomeration externalities. We
introduce a discrete-space version of the AA model, instead of the continuous-space version of the
original paper, to fit it in our context.
Assumptions. There are fixed number H of mobile consumers that choose residents. We denote
the spatial pattern of consumers by h. At each region i, a unique diﬀerentiated variety of good is
produced as Armington (1969). Production is assumed to be perfectly competitive and labor is the
only factor of production. Each mobile consumer inelastically supplies a single unit of labor. As
usual, we do not consider commuting of workers between two diﬀerent regions. We denote the wage
of workers byw. The transportation of goods between regions takes iceberg form; the firms at i must
export τi j > 0 unit of good to meet a single unit of demand at region j.
At each region, total factor productivities (TFP) and amenity at each region are directly aﬀected by
the number of its inhabitants, hi . These externalities are local in the sense that it does not depend on
distance between regions. The number of consumers at diﬀerent region does not aﬀect neither of TFP
or amenity at a region; it is exclusively enjoyed by the agents located at each region. As the analysis in
the present section will demonstrate, such assumption turns out to be insuﬃcient for endogenously
producing polycentricity of spatial agglomeration patterns.
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Preference. The utility function of a consumer in region i is defined as the following CES function:
ui({q ji})  ai ·
(∑
j∈K
q(σ−1)/σji
)σ/(σ−1)
, (C.12.1)
where q ji is the quantity of the good variety that is produced at region j ∈ K and consumed in region
i. The constant σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, and ai(hi) is the local amenity.
The local amenity deteriorates as population hi at i increase; it is defined by the following power
function that produces a congestion eﬀect:
ai(hi)  a¯ih−βi , (C.12.2)
where a¯i > 0, β ≥ 0 is exogenously given constants. In particular, a¯i represents the unobserved amenity
in region i. When β  0, there is no congestion eﬀect and the local amenity is exogenous constant a¯i .
The income of consumers comes only from the wage from production firms. We denote the price
of the variety that is produced at j and consumed at i is denoted by p ji . The wage in region i is
denoted by wi ≥ 0. Then, the budget constraint of a consumer who locates at i is given by the
following equation:
wi 
∑
j∈K
p jiq ji . (C.12.3)
To normalize wage, we impose a constraint
∑
i∈K wihi W , which means that the total income in the
economy always equals to the fixed constantW .
Utility maximization of consumers under a given price system p yields
q ji 
p−σji
P1−σi
wi , (C.12.4)
where Pi is the price index of the good in region i
Pi ≡
(∑
k∈K
p1−σki
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.12.5)
Production. Firms at region i ∈ K produce goods under perfect competition. As a result, the final
price of the good that is produced at i and sold at j, which we denote pi j , equals to
pi j 
wi
mi
τi j . (C.12.6)
wheremi denotes the TFP in region i. TomodelMarshallian agglomeration economy (Marshall, 1989)
in a reduced-form, the TFP in region i is assumed to be an increasing power function of its population
mi(hi)  m¯ihαi (C.12.7)
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with m¯i > 0, α ≥ 0 being exogenous constants. If α  0, the TFP in region i is a given constant m¯i .
Short-run equilibrium. In the following, we set m¯i  1, a¯i  1 for all i to abstract from any first-
nature advantages. In the short run, consumers are immobile across regions. We determine the
short-run indirect utility as a function of h by general equilibrium conditions, which consist of the
product market clearing and the zero-profit condition of firms. First, plugging (C.12.6) and (C.12.7)
into (C.12.5), with dki ≡ τ1−σki we obtain
Pi 
(∑
k∈K
w1−σk h
α(σ−1)
k dki
)1/(1−σ)
. (C.12.8)
The zero-profit condition of firms requires that the total revenue in region i is exhausted. This yields
the wage equation for the model:
wihi 
∑
j∈K
w1−σi h
α(σ−1)
i di j∑
k∈K w1−σk h
α(σ−1)
k dk j
w jh j . (C.12.9)
Given the short-run equilibrium wage w, the indirect utility function is given by
vi(h) 
h−βi wi
Pi
. (C.12.10)
Jacobian matrix at the flat-earth equilibrium. A direct computation shows that the Jacobian matrix of
the payoﬀ function ∇v(h¯) is given by
∇v(h¯)  [σI − D¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2]−1 [ − (α + β − γ0)I + (α + β + γ1)D¯] (C.12.11)
where γ0 ≡ 1+ασ and γ1 ≡ 1−βσ . Thus, one concludes that
∇v(h¯) ≃ c0I + c1D¯, (C.12.12)
with c0  −(α + β − γ0) and c1  α + β + γ1.
Numerical example. Figure 9 assumes Allen and Arkolakis (2014)’s model. The parameters are set
to α  0.5, β  0.3, σ  6, and H  10.
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D Comparative statics: Role of local factors
The majority of structural exercises in the current stream of quantitative spatial economics employs
local unobserved factors (i.e., heterogeneities in local amenities or productivity of firms) in replicating
the actual data, often under conditions where the uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured (Redding and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). For example, in the simplest form, structural residuals under fixed values of
the main exogenous parameters of the model (e.g., the expenditure share on manufactured goods µ
or the elasticity of substitution σ) are given broad interpretations such as recovered “local amenities”
and then utilized as exogenous parameters to conduct counterfactual analyses. In this section, we
explore implications of such approaches by simple comparative static analyses.
D.1 Structure of equilibrium spatial pattern with location-fixed factors
The payoﬀ function of an economic geographymodelwould bewritten as vi(h,A), whereA ≡ (Ai)i∈K
is the vector of location-fixed factors. There are two canonical examples of how location-fixed factors
are modeled in the literature.
The first and perhaps the simplest example is a location-fixed factor in the payoﬀ function
vi(h,Ai)  vˆi(h) + Ai (D.1.1)
where vˆi(h) is theA-independent component of vi(h,Ai), whichwe terma localheterogeneity. Wenote
that the specification (D.1.1) includes many models with location-fixed factors that directly aﬀect the
(indirect) utility of mobile workers. For instance, one will show that, by taking logarithm, the indirect
utility function of Allen and Arkolakis (2014)’s model that incorporates location-fixed amenities
reduces to (D.1.1). Such eﬀects also arise from local nontradable goods, where a representative
example being Helpman (1998). As it is evident from (C.4.11), when we let Ai : (1 − µ) log[Ai], the
model reduces to (D.1.1).
The second and more involved example is location-fixed factors that aﬀect interregional trade
flows, which we term a global heterogeneity. The regional model of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg
(2017), §3, is an example. Due to heterogeneities in local productivity of firms Ai , prices of manufac-
tured goods diﬀer across regions; then, trade balance implies that the wage in region i depends on
the whole pattern of A. Thus, vi(h,A) is (with slight notational abuse)
vi(h,A)  vi(h,w(h,A)) (D.1.2)
where w(h,A)  (wi(h,A)) denotes the wage vector. Krugman (1991)’s model also is an exam-
ple, where one may interpret that Ai represents the number of immobile workers in region i or,
alternatively, the region-specific productivity (as in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), §3).
We have seen that, assuming a racetrack economy and abstracting from first-nature advantages
by letting A  A¯ ≡ A¯1, the flat-earth equilibrium h¯ ≡ h1 is always an equilibrium. The question
asked in the present appendix is that: What happens when we consider variation in the spatial pattern of
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location-fixed factors? Does our classification obtained under no heterogeneities still matter?
Suppose that h¯ is the unique stable equilibrium. Then, we may view that the equilibrium spatial
pattern is a function of A so that h  h(A). In the vicinity of h¯, we have
h(A)  h(A¯ + δ) ≈ h¯ + JAδ, (D.1.3)
where δ  (δi) ≡ A − A¯  (Ai − A¯) is variation in A and JA ≡ [∂hi/∂A j] is the Jacobian matrix of the
spatial pattern of mobile agents with respect toA evaluated at A¯. Also, we define ϵ by
ϵ ≡ δ⊤(h − h¯)  δ⊤JAδ. (D.1.4)
Observe that if ϵ 
∑
i∈K δi(hi − h¯) ≥ 0 for any imposed nonzero variation δ in location-fixed factors,
we have δi(hi − h¯)  (Ai − A¯)(hi − h¯) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ K . The fact implies the following lemma:
LemmaD.1. Assume that JA  [∂hi/∂Ai] is positive definite atA  A¯ and consider a small variation
δ  (δi) , 0 in A such that A  A¯ + δ. Then, the sign of the variation in the location-fixed factor of
region i, δi  Ai − A¯, and that of the marginal increase in its population, hi − h, coincides.
The above lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for any economic geography model under which an
increase of location-fixed factor Ai implies population growth in region i and vice versa.
To employ Lemma D.1, we should evaluate JA. Below, we shall show that it is represented by the
Jacobian matrix of the payoﬀ function. First, we recall that an interior equilibrium with hi > 0 for all
i must be a solution to the following system of nonlinear equations:
v(h,A) − v¯(h,A)1  0, (D.1.5)
where v¯(h,A) ≡ H−1∑i∈K vi(h,A)hi denotes the average payoﬀ. The implicit function theorem
regarding the equilibrium equation (D.1.5) implies that, at (h¯, A¯), JA is evaluated as follows
JA  [cE − (I −E)J]−1[I −E]Jˆ (D.1.6)
where c ≡ h−1 v¯,E ≡ K−111⊤ is amatrixwhose elements are all 1/K, J ≡ [∂vi/∂hi], and Jˆ ≡ [∂vi/∂Ai].
All matrices are evaluated at the flat-earth pattern (h¯, A¯).
Since JA is symmetric at the flat-earth equilibrium, it is positive definite if and only if its eigenval-
ues are all positive. But, because JA is circulant, its eigenvalues is computable by the same procedure
as our stability analysis (Lemma B.2). We conclude that the eigenvalues ak of JA are given by62
ak 

0, k  0,
−e−1k eˆk , k  1, 2, . . . , K − 1,
(D.1.7)
62We note that I −E andE represent the projections onto the subspace of RK defined by∑i∈K xi  0 and its
orthogonal subspace, respectively, and their eigenvalues are (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1) and (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
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with ek and eˆk being the kth eigenvalue of J and Jˆ , respectively, where we assume that ek , 0.
Moreover, the eigenvectors of JA are again {ηk} with ηk  (cos[θki]) with k  0, 1, . . . , K − 1. Note
that we have a0  0. It is intuitive because it says that a uniform increase of Ai across the regions does
not aﬀect the spatial pattern—in other words, what matters is the relative variation in location-fixed
factors. Thus, without loss of generality, we shall rewrite δ 
∑
k∈K Ckηk and assume C0  0 so that
δ · 1  0. We then have h − h¯  ∑k∈K Ckakηk and
ϵ  δ⊤(h − h¯) 
∑
k∈K
C2kak , . (D.1.8)
If ak > 0 for all k ≥ 1, we have ϵ > 0. Each ak is an amplifying factor in the direction of ηk in the sense
that if δ  ηk we obtain h − h¯  akηk .
That said, we have two questions regarding the properties of ak . The first is obvious:
Question 1. Is ak > 0 for all k ≥ 1?
If true, from Lemma D.1, it implies that a relative advantage of a region implies a relative increase of
its population and vice versa. As we will see below, generally this is the case.
The second is of importance: What happens on {ak} if we face change (in particular, a decrease) in
transportation costs? Put another way, does an increase of the trade freeness r (see Section B.2) imply
a strengthened role of first natures—or converse? In concrete terms:
Question 2. Is dak/dr positive (or negative) for all k ≥ 1?
We see that, because
dϵ
dr

∑
i∈K
C2k
dak
dr
, (D.1.9)
if dak/dr happened to be positive for all k ≥ 1, it means that as r increases (τ decreases), the location-
fixed factors matters more; converse is also true.
D.2 Role of location-fixed factors: Model class matters
For simplicity, consider the simplest case (local heterogeneity), as in (D.1.1). We note that for (D.1.1),
we have Jˆ  I and thus eˆk  1, which in turn implies that ak  −e−1k . Recalling that if the flat-earth
equilibrium is stable, we have ek < 0 for all k, we see that ak > 0. Thus, it must be that ϵ > 0 for
any relative variation δ in A. Thus, the answer to the first question is “yes”: any relative first-nature
(dis)advantage in terms of location-fixed amenities increases (decreases) local population when the
flat-earth equilibrium is stable—it is, of course, hardly a surprise.
We shall turn our attention to the second question. As we will see, asking the question reveals a
majorwatershed between themodel classes (i) and (ii): when the economy faces a decrease in transportation
costs, the eﬀects of location-fixed advantages are typically in the opposite direction for class-(i) and (ii).
For class (i) models in the literature, there is a determinate implication regarding the eﬀects of a
decline in interregional transport costs on first-nature advantages. So long as the flat-earth pattern is
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stable, we have63
dak
dr
> 0. (D.2.1)
Thus, the positive eﬀects of relative location-fixed advantages increase according to the decrease of interregional
transportation costs. Under the stability of the flat-earth equilibrium, a decrease in interregional
transportation cost fosters more agglomeration at the regions with relative advantages in amenity.
In fact, this leads to instability of the flat-earth equilibrium because at the first break point we have
ek  0 for some k and hence ak  ∞ for that k. Thus, the model leads to regional divergence, even in
the range of transportation costs where the flat-earth equilibrium is stable.
For class (ii) models, a decrease in transportation costs has the opposite implication compared with
class (i) models. We illustrate it using Helpman (1998)’s model. For the original model with public
landownership, we have
dak
dr
< 0 (D.2.2)
whenever stability of the flat-earth equilibrium is ensured regardless of the level of r, by the condition
σ(1 − µ) > 1. Thus, the regions once flourished by first-nature advantages due to larger endowments
of housing space will decline if interregional transportation cost decrease. Assuming diﬀerent speci-
fication of local factors as in (D.1.2) does not alter the result. In fact, as we will see, if we consider a
variant model whereA is interpreted to heterogeneities in local productivity as in the regional model
of Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), §3 (see Section C.4), we have the same result: ak > 0 and that
dak/dr < 0; the result also is consistent with the numerical exercise conducted by the paper. In short,
in class (ii) models, the role of initial heterogeneity declines in line with decreasing transportation
costs.
The interpretation of the behavior of class (ii) models is straightforward. As the role of interre-
gional transportation costs declines, local dispersion force dominates. Then, an agglomeration that
is formed solely by its local advantages must face relative second-nature disadvantage due to local
congestion compared to those formerly behind, leading to a relative decline of such a region.
In light of this, assumptions on landownership can have impacts on the sign of dak/dr. In par-
ticular, local landownership, by redistribution of local rental revenue, can relax the magnitude of the
second-nature disadvantage at the regions where housing rent is high. If expenditure share on hous-
ing good is suﬃciently high, via redistribution, it can overcome relative second-nature disadvantage,
so that dak/dr > 0. If we assume local landownership in Helpman (1998) as in Redding and Sturm
63For all class (i) models in the literature, we have ek  G( fk(r))/φ( fk(r))with strictly positive and decreasing
function φ( f ) (see Appendix C). Noting that d fk/dr < 0, it then implies that
dak
dr
 −de
−1
k
dr
 − d
dr
(
φ( fk(r))
G( fk(r))
)
 −φ
′( fk)G( fk) − φ( fk)G′( fk)
{G( fk)}2
d fk
dr
> 0
where we note that φ′( fk)G( fk) − φ( fk)G′( fk) is strictly positive since φ′( fk) < 0, φ( fk) > 0, and because the
flat-earth equilibrium is stable G( fk) < 0 and G′( fk) < 0.
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(2008), we obtain
dak
dr

< 0, if µ¯ < µ < 1,
> 0, if 0 < µ < µ¯,
(D.2.3)
with µ¯ ≡ 2(σ−1)2
2σ2−2σ+1 <
σ−1
σ , which confirms the above speculation. The result illustrates the basic role
of a local dispersion force and typically less featured assumptions on landownership.
Thus, whether the second-nature causation of an economic geography model boosts first-nature
advantages in line of decreasing transportation costs or not depends on the model class it belongs.
Below, in addition to the simplest case (D.1.1), we provide examples of global heterogeneity where
the payoﬀ is given by (D.1.2). For this case, we have ∇Av  ∇wv∇Aw. Because ak (k ≥ 1) is the kth
eigenvalue of (∇hv)−1(∇Av), we first evaluate the two matrices and then their product. We note that,
given any wage equation W (h,w,A)  0 that incorporates local factors A, we have the following
computation:
∇hv  {φ(D¯)}−1GH(D¯), ∇Av  {φ(D¯)}−1GA(D¯), (D.2.4)
where we define matrix polynomials φ, GH, and GA of D¯ by
φ(D¯) ≡ (∇wW )−1 , GH(D¯) ≡ ∇hv∇wW − ∇wv∇hW , GA(D¯) ≡ ∇Av∇wW − ∇wv∇AW . (D.2.5)
Employing these formula, we see ek  GH( fk)/φ( fk) and eˆk  GA( fk)/φ( fk), so that we have a0  0,
and, for k ≥ 1,
ak  −GA( fk)GH( fk) . (D.2.6)
This in turn implies
dak
dr
 −G
′
A( fk)GH( fk) − GA( fk)G′H( fk)
{GH( fk)}2
d fk
dr
. (D.2.7)
But, since we have d fk/dr < 0, we conclude
sgn
dak
dr
 sgn
[
G′A( fk)GH( fk) − GA( fk)G′H( fk)
]
. (D.2.8)
Basically, location-fixed factors that aﬀect trade flows can be modeled by employing either of
the two form in the following examples. The following two examples demonstrates that the above
implication, namely model class matters even when uniqueness is the case, holds true for the cases where
the level of location-fixed factor in a region aﬀects the nominal wages in the other regions.
Example D.1 (Heterogeneous local productivity (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, §3)). Produc-
tivity of firms diﬀer across regions and thus aﬀect the regional share in trade flows. Thewage equation
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for the model is defined by (C.4.19):
Wi(h,w,A)  wihi −
∑
j∈K
hiAiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkAkw1−σk dk j
w jh j  0. (D.2.9)
Without heterogeneities in the per capita housing space, the indirect utility function is
vi 
µ
σ − 1 ln[∆i] + µ ln[wi] − (1 − µ) ln[hi] (D.2.10)
with ∆i ≡ ∑k∈K h jAiw1−σj d ji . Employing these formulae, we compute as follows:
∇hv  1h
(
µ
σ − 1D¯ − (1 − µ)I
)
, ∇wv  1w¯ µ(I − D¯), ∇Av 
1
A
µ
σ − 1D¯, (D.2.11)
∇hW  −w¯D¯(I − D¯), ∇wW  h{σI − (σ − 1)D¯}(I + D¯), ∇AW  − 1Aw¯h(I − D¯)(I + D¯). (D.2.12)
These formulae implies that, without heterogeneities in the per capita housing space, we have:
GH( f )  1σ (1 − f )
[
− (1 − µ) +
( µσ
σ − 1 −
σ − 1
σ
)
f
]
(D.2.13)
GA( f )  − hA
µ
σ − 1 (1 − f )
[(σ − 1) + σ f ] < 0 (D.2.14)
Employing the formulae, one can show that, whenever equilibrium is unique (σ(1 − µ) > 1), we have
GH( f ) < 0 and thus ak ≥ 0 for all k. Also, it follows that dak/dr < 0 for all k ≥ 1. We also note
that GH( f ) < 0 implies stability of h¯. We note that, if there are no exogenous heterogeneities in
A, the model is isomorphic to Redding and Sturm (2008) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) regarding
second-nature mechanism.
ExampleD.2 (Heterogeneous local market size (Krugman, 1991)). Consider Krugman (1991)’smodel.
Assuming there are first-nature heterogeneities in local endowments of immobile agents, one can
model heterogeneities in market size. For the model, the wage equation is
Wi(h,w,A)  wihi − µ
∑
j∈K
hiw1−σi di j∑
k∈K hkw1−σk dk j
(wihi + Ai)  0 (D.2.15)
where Ai as the number of immobile workers in region i. We compute as follows:
∇hv  1h
µ
σ − 1D¯, ∇wv 
1
w¯
(I − µD¯), ∇Av  0, (D.2.16)
∇hW  −w¯D¯(µI − D¯), ∇wW  h{σI − µD¯ − (σ − 1)D¯2}, ∇AW  −µD¯. (D.2.17)
Then, we have
GH( f )  1σ
[ ( µ
σ − 1 +
µ
σ
)
f −
(
µ2
σ − 1 +
1
σ
)
f 2
]
, (D.2.18)
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GA( f )  µw¯ f (1 − µ f ) > 0. (D.2.19)
Employing these formulae, one can show that ak ≥ 0 for all k and that dak/dr > 0 for all k ≥ 1
whenever the flat-earth equilibrium is stable (i.e., GH( f ) < 0).
Remark D.1. There are models, e.g., Redding and Turner (2015), §20.3, that employ both local and
global heterogeneities such that
vi(h,A,B)  vi(h,w(h,A)) + Bi (D.2.20)
where A  (Ai) and B  (Bi) are exogenous constants that reflect global and local heterogeneities,
respectively. Since A and B are not related to each other, the Jacobian matrix with respect to these
two heterogeneities is given by a block-diagonal form and the eﬀects of each heterogeneity can be
studied separately.
D.3 Numerical examples
This section provides numerical examples to complement the above formal analysis which is focused
on infinitesimally small variations inA. Below, focusing on the most canonical form of location-fixed
factors as in (D.1.1), we add an extra positive constant term A0 to the indirect utility of region 0, so
that the region has an exogenous advantage. Our numerical results suggest that the drawn formal
conclusions correctly predict tendency in agglomeration patterns even when a strong location-fixed
eﬀect is imposed.
Figure 16 andFigure 17 report the results of our numerical experiments under three representative
setting, namely, a class (ii) model under uniqueness of equilibrium, class-(i) and (ii) models under
a multiplicity of equilibria. In line with the numerical examples discussed in Section 5 (Figure 8
and Figure 9), Krugman (1991) and Allen and Arkolakis (2014) are employed for the examples for
class (i) and (ii), respectively. We note that the latter is isomorphic to Helpman (1998) with local
landownership (i.e., Redding and Sturm, 2008; Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
The figures show the population share of region 0 at stable equilibria, λ0 ≡ hi/H, against τ for
four diﬀerent settings of A0 in {0, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01}. A0  0 is the baseline case with no location-fixed
advantage. Under our parameter setting, A0 accounts for 0.5∼100% of the indirect utility of region 0
and hence has significant eﬀects on equilibrium patterns.
Figure 16 reports evolutionary paths of λ0 for the model by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) [class (ii)]
under uniqueness of equilibrium. The parameters are the same as Figure 9 except that we let β  0.6.
This implies α + β ≤ 0 and hence equilibrium is unique regardless of the level of transportation
costs (refer to Section 5.2). Compared to the baseline case A0  0, λ0 is larger for the other cases
(A0  0.001, 0.005, 0.01); this corresponds to the condition ak > 0. Also, λ0 is increasing in A0, which
is intuitive. Furthermore, λ0 decreases in line with τ, which is consistent with dak/dr < 0.
Figure 17 reports evolutionary paths of λ0 for the models by Krugman (1991) [class (i)] and Allen
and Arkolakis (2014) [class (ii)] under a multiplicity of equilibria. The basic model parameters other
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Figure 16: Population share of region 0under uniqueness of equilibrium [Allen andArkolakis (2014)’s
model]
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Figure 17: Population share of region 0 and under multiplicity of equilibria
than A0 are the same as Figure 8 and Figure 9. One confirms that the figures also exhibit consistency
with our predictions: that (a) ak > 0 and that (b) dak/dr > 0 for class-(i) and dak/dr < 0 for class (ii)
model, provided that the h¯ is stable. For all A0  0.001, 0.005, 0.01, λ0 is greater than that for A0  0,
which confirms ak > 0. Also, focusing on the ranges τ ∈ (τ∗ ,∞) (for Panel A) and τ ∈ (0, τ∗∗) (for
Panel B), the curves confirms (b). It is interesting to observe that, even though our predictions do not
cover τ ∈ (0, τ∗) for Panel A, a similar relation robustly holds true: so long as the global structure
of the spatial pattern is unchanged (i.e., bifurcation is not encountered), a monotonic decrease of τ
imply a greater role of location-fixed advantage of region 0.
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